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Abstract
IT2000 is a strategic national information technology (IT) policy introduced by
the Singaporean government in 1992. The Construction and Real Estate Network
(CORENET) is one of such several sectoral applications of IT, expected to be
implemented in the construction industry. IT has special significance for Singaporean
economic development. Planning practices for the national IT policy in each historic
phase have been typical of the Singaporean approach to economic development. The
Singaporean construction industry also has a particular role in Singaporean economic
development. This thesis analyzes the political, economic, and technical environment
surrounding IT and construction and makes some recommendations for successful
implementation of the proposed CORENET project.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lee W. McKnight
Title: Principal Research Associate at the Research Program on Communication Policy
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Chapter One
Introduction: IT-led economic development and the
Singaporean Nil policy
In 1992, the Singaporean government revealed the nation's third national IT
(Information Technology) infrastructure policy, called IT2000. IT2000 attracted the
attention of many telecommunication and IT people around the world as there was an
emerging trend of National Information Infrastructure (NII) policy development in every
part of the world such as the US Information Superhighway. However, the IT2000
policyl is typically Singaporean in that it emphasizes an NII economic development
policy rather than a telecommunication and infrastructure policy. Of course, NII policy
in other countries also aims to yield economic value rather than to simply promote
telecommunication industry development. What is particularly interesting about the
Singapore case is that the government is attempting to integrate all public and private NII
applications under a nationally-planned unified framework. Such a strong initiative of
the state in the NII policy can be observed in other industrialized economies such as the
United States, but the extent and procedures for intervention are typically Singaporean. It
is interesting that a developing country employs a non-manufacturing-oriented policy
such as the IT policy as an economic development strategy, although Singapore may no
longer be regarded as a developing country but one of the newly industrialized economies
(NIEs) in terms of real GDP level. This approach is relatively new and referred as IT-led
development in some literature (Saito, 1988). Singaporean case is a valuable example to
prove this theory.
IT2000 presents various industrial and social applications of the IT, attempting to
restructure a current manufacturing-dependent economic structure into more information-
oriented one. Among the various industrial applications featured in IT2000, this thesis
particularly focuses on the Construction and Real Estates Network (CORENET) as an
example of the economic development policy aspect of IT2000. CORENET is a
proposed integrated data network for the construction industry (Hu, 1994). Its main
1 In fact, there are other NII projects called IT2000 in the world such as Vietnamese IT2000 policy.
Although I may cite the case in other countries for the purpose of comparison in this thesis, IT2000 denotes
Singaporean policy unless otherwise noted.
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functional purpose is to facilitate the data flow associated with application and approval
processes between the industry and government. In addition, it features design support,
information reference, and procurement functions in its integrated system. In so doing, it
is intended to help the construction industry raise its internal productivity and as a result
the industry's overall economic efficiency.
Even though this project seems quite feasible given the small size of the industry,
questions arise when we ask how much effect we can expect from this particular
industrial infrastructure development programme. The Singaporean economy, not only in
the construction industry, has some very particular characteristics. First, the Singaporean
economy is very dependent on foreign capital. The Construction industry is not an
exception. Thus, meeting the interests of foreign investors is an essential policy goal.
However, assisting local firms may also be important if Singapore aims to reduce this
dependency in the future. The second consideration is Singapore's small size. Smallness
is an advantage when considering the ease of regulating and coordinating the industry,
but turns out to be a constraint when one considers the amount of capital and investment
required. Finally, particular Singaporean policy implementation practices also may be
either an advantage or a constraint. Considering these factors, this thesis asks the
following questions. Can the proposed CORENET project really be a new economic
engine as the IT2000 plan expects? Overall, what policy measures should the
government take to realize this expectation?
To answer these questions, this thesis analyzes the following issues. In chapter
two, Singaporean economic development history is reviewed to clarify the role of IT and
telecommunication policy in the Singaporean economic development context. In chapter
three, the focus is on the institutional framework for forming a national IT policy to
clarify what kind of regime has actually worked for policy formation and implementation.
In chapter four, the economic effects of government efforts to promote IT and
telecommunication infrastructure development are analyzed by applying historical data to
econometric models (Saunders, 1994). In chapter five, specific IT applications in the
construction industry are reviewed. It first reviews construction industry professional
practices and environmental concerns. Secondly, after investigating technological
features and the specifications of the existing and proposed construction industry data
network, it clarifies the problems ahead that must be overcome for the successful
implementation of the project. Chapter six summarizes the conclusions of the previous
16
chapters and presents some policy recommendations that would improve the likelihood of
successfully implementing the CORENET project.
The question addressed from these analyses from a technology and policy
perspective is whether a non-manufacturing technology policy such as IT policy can be a
central strategy for economic development. Traditional economic development policies
emphasized export-oriented strategies to raise industrial output, but IT typically does not
raise output directly. It only raises industrial efficiency. How effective this strategy is in
the economic development context depends on the industrial and economic level of the
country; therefore, this Singaporean case study should attract the attention of students in
the IT-led economic development field. I hope this work contributes to the field by
presenting evidence from the Singaporean construction industry.
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Chapter Two
IT, telecommunication and economic development in
Singapore
2.1. Inherent conditions and government's basic strategies
Singapore is a small city state located at the edge of the Malay Peninsula in
Southeast Asia. It became be a British colony in 1819, and gained full independence as a
republic in 1965. It has almost no natural resources to be exported, little land on which to
place large scale manufacturing sites, and a small labor force limiting the growth of
manufacturing. On the other hand, located on the Strait of Malacca, it has enjoyed a
geographical advantage as an entrepot center in international trade between Asia and
Europe. The Singaporean government, recognizing these constraints and advantages, has
employed and implemented a unique economic development policy compared with other
Asian NIEs. Those inherent conditions are comparable with those of Hong Kong;
however, the policy course the government has actually traced is totally different in terms
of the degree of intervention in the domestic economy.
There are several characteristics of Singaporean economic development, but two
of them will be stressed in this thesis. The first is a very high level of dependency on
foreign investment for capital formation. As Singapore had no local industries at the time
of independence and almost no ability to establish them by itself, it had to totally rely on
foreign capital to establish and promote industrial development. Noticing the importance
of maintaining access to foreign capital, the government has always provided various
monetary and non-monetary incentives for foreign firms which offer to establish
operations in Singapore. An example of monetary incentives is a generous tax deduction
for manufacturing sites. An example of a non-monetary one is the provision of excellent
social infrastructure such as public utilities and telecommunication infrastructures. Some
of these policy measures are elaborated on in the following subchapters.
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Table 2.1: Size of public sector in Singapore (1990)
Category No. of Employees Ratio (%)
SOEs and GLCs 83,700 5.5
Statutory Boards 59,500 3.9
Total 143,200 9.4
Total Work Force 1,516,000 100.0
Source: EDB, Annual Reports of Statutory Boards, cited in Soon et al. (1993)
Table 2.2: Percentage distribution of firms, sales, profits and assets of the largest 500
firms in Singapore (1986)
Category Firms Sales Profits Assets
Foreign 62.8 63.8 70.5 44.2
Singapore 37.2 36.2 29.5 55.8
GLC 4.4 12.2 19.5 22.9
Non-GLC 32.8 24.0 10.0 32.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Soon et al. (1993)
The second characteristic is the government's extensive intervention into
economic activities. In almost every economic sector, the government has a statutory
board, a kind of government-owned company under a particular ministry. Roles of the
statutory boards are sometimes to simply conduct its business as usual, or sometimes to
plan a specific industrial policy and lead the development of a particular sector. The
Economic Development Board (EDB) is positioned as a special statutory board under the
Ministry of Finance (MOF), and is responsible for overall industrialization policy
planning. The government also owns a considerable number2 of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), which later came to be referred to as government-linked companies (GLCs). The
discussion of their possible privatization began in recent years. The presence of GLCs
and statutory boards in the Singaporean economy is very dominant. According to a study
in 1990, they altogether provided about 10% of total employment (Soon et al., 1993,
Table 2.1). Another study in 1989 revealed that the GLCs accounted for 12.2% of sales,
19.5% of profits, and 22.5% of the assets of the 500 largest firms in Singapore although
their number is relatively low at 4.4% of the total number of the Singaporean firms (Soon
2 As of 1993, the number of statutory boards in Singapore is 80, while that of SOEs and GLCs is 450. (EIU,
1994)
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et al., 1993, Table 2.2). We can also observe in the same table that foreign firms and
GLCs altogether accounted for 90% of profits in the economy. Local non-GLC firms are
extremely few either in their number or actual economic importance to the economy.
As we can observe based on these characteristics, contrary to the general laissez
faire image, Singaporean economic development policy has been very interventionist.
The government intentionally provided generous incentives for foreign firms to attract
them and promote rapid industrialization, but at the same time it has fully utilized state
power to influence the development of each industry through the statutory boards and
GLCs. In sum, Singapore's pro-business environment has been created through extensive
government intervention and control, rather than a free market mechanism. This point is
often contrasted with Hong Kong's economic development policy, which has not taken
any interventionist measures in order to assure growth in international trade. However,
recent studies pointed out that Singapore's dependency on foreign investment and
government's interventionism have as a result considerably restricted the proper
development of local firms (Krause et al., 1987 and Chee, 1994).
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2.2. Historical review of policy goals and implementation
Information Technology (IT) and telecommunication policy has played a very
important role in the economic development of Singapore. As discussed in the previous
subchapter, apparently constrained by its physical size, Singapore had to choose a totally
dependent economic development style on foreign investments. Therefore, a policy for
facilitating excellent public utility and communication infrastructure naturally has been
one of the prioritized options for providing an incentive to foreign firms to come to
Table 2.3: Economic development obectives and policy responses in each phase
Economic Primary development Economic and industrial Telecommunication and IT
development objectives policy response policy response
phase
Phase I: * Employment creation · Tax incentives for foreign
Labor- * Infrastructural investment (1967)
intensive development * Improvement of
export- government-union
oriented relationship
manufacturing
(1965- 1972)
Phase II: · Improvement of labor · Tax relief for industrial * Telecommunication
Industrial shortage training expenses (1973) Authority of Singapore
upgrading * Upgrade of industries' * Minimum wage policy (1974)
(1973 - 1978) technological content (1973)
Phase III: · Industrial diversification * Minimum wage policy * Committee on National
Economic * Intensification of foreign (1980-1983) Computerization (1980)
restructuring investment promotion * Designation of target * CNC Report (1980)
(1979-1984) industries for promotion * National Computer Board
(1981)
* Civil Service
Computerization Programme
(1981)
* The TAS Act (1982)
Phase IV: · Reduction of labor cost · Privatization of some * National IT Plan (1986)
Retrenchment * Upgrade of local industry statutory board (1985) * TradeNet initiative(1986)
and further * Promotion of high-tech * Flexible wage system * Small Enterprise
diversification manufacturing industry * Venture Fund (EDB) Computerization Programme
(1985- 1989) * Internationalization of (1986)
local firms
Phase V: * Enhancement of ordinary * The Next Lap (1990) * Commencement of IT2000
Restructuring people's life * National Science and project (1990)
into an * Creation and promotion Technology Board (1990) * National IT
information of service sectors * Strategic Economic Plan Committee(1992)
economy (1991) * IT2000 report (1992)
(1990 - ) * National Technology Plan * Privatization of Singapore
(1991) Telecom (1992)
* Public listing of Singapore
Telecom (1993)
Source: Soon et al., 1993 and Wong, 1993
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Singapore. Like other developing countries, to meet these policy ends, the government
has taken a monopolized telecommunication market policy to provide a unified, cheap,
and convenient telecommunication service. Government has also implemented an
effective IT industry promotion policy to overcome absolute labor shortages as it noticed
that high-tech industry, such as IT, has a capability to transform an industrial structure
from a labor-intensive to skill-intensive one.
An historical overview of economic development policies in Singapore is shown
in Table 2.3. The history of Singaporean economic development since its independence
can be divided into five phases according to the primary developmental goals in response
to external environmental changes sought by the government in each phase.. Note that
the table does not include all government initiatives, because the purpose of following
discussion is not to elaborate Singaporean economic development history but to assess
how this affected IT, telecommunication, and economic policy formation in the
Singaporean economic development context.
2.2.1. Labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing (1965 - 1972)
The first phase began with Singapore's independence from the Malay federation in
1965. Until then Singaporean economic policy had traced a labor-intensive import-
substitution strategy. Local Singaporean government did so because that was the only
plausible measure to solve a high unemployment problem which had consistently existed
since it gained self governance from Britain and joined the federation in 1959. Another
reason is that Singapore could benefit by doing so because it could fully take advantage
of its good tradition as an enterpot center inherited from the former British colony.
However, as a result of Singapore's independence which was caused by political conflict
with the Malay government, it lost a significant part of its economic access to the
Malaysian market. The Singaporean government, observing its still high unemployment
rate, had to change its policy course to a labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing
strategy (Phase I). Generous tax relief and exemption measures were offered to foreign
manufacturers willing to establish their manufacturing operations in Singapore. The
Economic outcome of these policy measures was very impressive. During the 1965-72
period, real GDP grew at an annual rate of about 13% (Figure 2.1).
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2.2.2. Industrial upgrading (1973 - 1978)
In the early 1970s, Singapore achieved almost full employment and conversely
faced a serious labor shortage. In the previous phase, Singapore had concentrated on a
labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing strategy to solve a severe unemployment
situation. However, unemployment was soon solved partly due to the government's
extensive effort to promote labor intensive industry, partly due to a relatively small
population that the state originally had. Ironically, government efforts to create
employment yielded another problem of severe labor deadlock, and Singapore had come
to be no longer able to run its industrial sector without importing a labor force from
neighboring countries. Worst of all, foreign investment inflow also significantly declined
in this period. Seeing this environmental change, the policy course the government took
was to upgrade the technological contents of manufacturing sectors (Phase II). As there
was no hope for a sudden increase in domestic manpower, what the government sought
was to make the whole economic structure less dependent on the absolute scale of the
labor force by promoting the development of more skill- and knowledge-intensive
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Figure 2.1: GDP and its growth in Singapore (1965-1994)
Source: UN (annual), EDB (annual), and DOS (1995)
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industries. The policy measures the government took were two-fold; the promotion of
industrial training of workers in high-tech industry by giving tax relief for training costs,
and the introduction of a minimum wage policy to make existing labor-intensive
industries less attractive to foreign firms.
Infrastructure development was also intensified in this period as an incentive for
foreign investors. Since independence, the Telecommunication Department under the
Ministry of Communication had taken a role of a regulator, and the Singapore Telephone
Board (STB), a statutory board, had been given a sole license as a telephone service
provider. In 1974, the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore (TAS), a statutory
board, was established through the merger of the Telecommunication Department and
STB. TAS was vested as a sole authority as a telecommunication service provider and
regulator. This restructuring of the telecommunication regulatory environment indicates
the government's strong intention to promote telecommunication infrastructure
development through its strong leadership.
Despite a variety of aggressive policy measures, economic outcomes were not
successful. Although the government set up a national institution to control minimum
wage levels, an orderly increase in the wage level was not accomplished because of the
fear of recession and resulting unemployment (Soon et al., 1993). However, the low
wages ironically led to the further growth in manufacturing sectors, and the
intensification of infrastructure development led to growth in the construction industry.
As a result, Singapore could achieve a relatively high annual real GDP growth rate of
about 7% during this phase though other neighboring countries had been struggling with
economic difficulties facing the oil crisis in 1973.
2.2.3. Economic restructuring (1979-1984)
By the end of the 1970s, the government's policy to attract foreign investment had
succeeded. Especially in the manufacturing sector, the share of foreign firms in industrial
output exceeded 70%,3 which is an unusual number compared with other neighboring
Asian NIEs. On the other hand, there was a trend of emerging harsh competition around
3 According to Soon, et al. (1993), foreign firms provided 73.7% of gross industrial output and 58.8% of
employment in the manufacturing sector in 1980
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Southeast Asia while the government intention to upgrade the industry had not met much
success as discussed above.
Observing this situation, the government proceeded to adopt a more open
financial policy, but did not abandon its high wage control policy to encourage industrial
upgrading. It tried to expand the foreign share further by allowing 100% foreign
ownership in almost every sector, even though the share was already very high. In its
further effort to upgrade the economy, along with the continuing high-wage policy, the
government designated particular industries for targeted industry promotion. EDB
conducted an extensive survey on world high-technologies, and specified several
manufacturing sectors to be promoted in its report in early 1980. The government
provided special financial incentives for those targeted industries. Furthermore, extensive
investment introduction activity was conducted through EDB's overseas offices in over
20 industrialized countries.
In an effort to promote industrial upgrading, the government began to pay more
attention to productivity enhancement in the civil service. Government saw that a
competent and productive civil service would be essential to help industry gain
international competitiveness through industrial upgrading. To realize these ends, the
government launched the first integrated computerization project as part of a productivity
enhancement project in the civil service. In 1980, the Committee on National
Computerization (CNC) was formed by high-level ministerial officials, and in the same
year, it released the CNC report, which is the first national IT policy. The report
recommended government promote civil service computerization, and establish a firm
institutional framework to lead the project. In response to the report, National Computer
Board (NCB), a new statutory board, was established and was expected to spearhead a
newly launched Civil Service Computerization Programme (CSCP) in 1981. The details
of these movements are discussed in the following chapter, but it must be noticed here
that the first national IT policy emerged in the context of industrial upgrading policy.
In the telecommunication development area, a new institutional framework was
formed in this period. The TAS Act of 1982 created a new statutory body, Singapore
Telecom (ST) under TAS, and vested ST with an exclusive right to regulate and operate a
telecommunications business (Wong, 1993). Under the Act, the Postal Service
Department was hived off from the Ministry of Communication and merged with the
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TAS. Thus, TAS became a sole authority overseeing all communication activity in
Singapore. This would seem to be moving backward compared with the world trend of
divestiture of telecommunication industry, but the intention of the TAS Act was to
facilitate communication infrastructure development under a strong institutional
framework (Heng et al., 1989). The outcomes of this telecommunication industry
restructuring proved to be successful. ST succeeded in providing an excellent
telecommunication infrastructure by the mid-1980s with no state subsidy. The success in
the telecommunication infrastructure development contributed to the economy as a
further incentive for foreign firms to establish their operation in Singapore.
However, the economic performance of these policy measures was not so
appealing. Real GDP growth during this period was about 8% but most of the growth
came from the construction and financial service sectors. Economic diversification
policy had much worked on the financial sector but the manufacturing sector suffered a
relatively low growth rate of about an annual 5% despite the government's high-tech
industry promotion effort, partly due to the oil crisis and continued high-wage policy.
However, an electronics industry grew gradually because Japanese electronics
manufacturers rushed to shift their production operation to this area suffering from rapid
Japanese-yen appreciation (Hayashi, 1990). Government efforts to educate highly skilled
workers enabled a synergy with this boom of Japanese electronics firms shifting
manufacturing off-shore, and resulted in attracting other foreign electronics firms in later
years.
2.2.4. Retrenchment and further diversification (1985 - 1989)
In 1985, the Singaporean economy experienced the first negative real GDP
growth. Many economists analyzed that the recession occurred because the Singaporean
economy lost its competitiveness in the foreign investment market compared with other
neighboring Southeast Asian countries mostly due to its continuing high-wage policy.
The government quickly responded to the recession by forming a special high-level
ministerial council to analyze and discuss the cause of the recession. Several recovery
measures were designated. Government temporarily gave up its high-wage policy and
introduced a flexible wage policy to recover the international competitiveness of its labor
force. Furthermore, special attention was paid to the competitiveness of local small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for the first time. EDB established an S$100 million
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venture fund to encourage the co-investment of MNCs and local SMEs in founding new
technology companies, expecting technology transfer occurring between them. Another
initiative for enhancing the local SME's productivity, the Small Enterprise
Computerization Programme (SECP), later renamed as Local Enterprise Computerization
Programme (LECP), was launched in 1986. SECP offered SMEs various financial and
technical incentives to proceed to their internal computerization. The details of the
programme are elaborated in the following chapter.
Among several strategies designated, one of the most challenging was probably
the review of the Singaporean economic structure itself. Government saw that the
manufacturing-centered industrial policy would continue to dampen the possibility of
economic growth, and decided to change the policy course to reduce the dependency on
the manufacturing sector. Promotion of an information and service sector was one of the
measures then taken. As discussed in the previous subchapter, the government's effort to
facilitate the telecommunication infrastructure had been successful by mid-1980s, and the
world-class telecommunication infrastructure had already become a competitive
advantage for the Singaporean economy. Usage of computers in all economic sectors
had also become prevalent by this phase partly thanks to the government efforts to
promote computerization. The government saw a new economic possibility in merging
IT and telecommunications, and began discussing a more strategic national IT policy.
Such movement was materialized by the formation of the National IT Plan (NITP) in
1986. NITP was the second integrated national IT policy, and its scope was extended to
include the private sector for the first time. Thus, IT policy became one of the major
components of Singaporean economic development policy.
In the telecommunication field, the trend of privatization hit the industry.
Government saw that excessive dominance of statutory boards was damping the
competitiveness and vitality of the economy, and decided to proceed to privatize them to
induce a freer economy. In 1985, the government announced its intention to privatize
some statutory boards, and TAS was included in the list. Discussion of privatization
4 World competitiveness report in 1990 praised Singapore for offering the most convenient and excellent
telecommunication infrastructure in the world. This fact partly proves that those statutory boards, ST and
TAS, have worked very economically efficiently though they can be seen as a kind of a public corporation,
which is regarded as relatively inefficient in general.
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continued, and finally in 1992, the Singapore Telecom was completely separated from
TAS as a private limited company responsible for a telephone network service provider.
The shares of the Singapore Telecom were held by Temasek Holdings, a government-
linked company (GLC) under the Ministry of Finance (MOF), but in the next year, the
Singapore Telecom became a public listed company and some shares were allowed to be
held by the private sector.5 With this restructuring, the Telecommunication Authority of
Singapore (TAS) was reconstituted into a new a statutory board responsible for regulation
and policy planning in the telecommunication industry.
As a result of these policy measures, the economy quickly recovered from the
recession. Real GDP growth was 1.8% in 1986, and continued to grow about from 8 to
11% annually until 1990.
2.2.5. Restructuring into an information economy (1990 -)
In 1990, fundamental environmental change came from the political arena. Lee
Kuan Yew, the prime minister leading Singapore with his strong leadership since
independence, resigned his post, and Goh Chok Tong took over the post of the prime
minister. Lee's resignation was said to occur because he recognized the political
stagnation resulting from over 30 years of his strong and absolute leadership as the prime
minister, but another cause was the criticism from foreign countries against his too long
authoritarian control over Singaporean politics.
This change in the political environment shocked various societies and some fears
for the future development of the nation arose because the leadership by Lee had been too
strong and dependable for Singaporean people to accept a new leadership. PM Goh
responded to the people's fear by quickly presenting a new policy course for the 1990s.
The policy statement, called the Next Lap, was compiled by a cabinet committee and
released in 1990. In the Next Lap, PM Goh emphasized the importance of the people's
unity and effort to collaborate to make their own future livings. Singapore, with
considerable physical constraints, had to rely on its people to develop its economy and
society, but the PM's message impressed the people in another sense because the people
5 As of 1994, 89.19% of the shares is held by the Temasek Holdings, and the rest of them is held by private
banks including foreign banks (ST, 1994).
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had not had to worry about themselves since they had been protected under Lee's paternal
leadership.
Various policy responses to the Next Lap arose from various communities. The
Strategic Economic Plan (SEP) was released in 1991 as an economic policy strategy by
the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). Reportedly as a response to the Next Lap from
NCB, IT2000 initiative was informally commenced in 1990 and the IT2000 official
report was released in 1992. IT2000 proposed the construction of a more integrated
information network which incorporates not only government and business activities but
the life of ordinary people. The details of IT2000 and its policy formation practice are
discussed in the following chapter.
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2.3. Conclusion for chapter 2
Significant growth of the Singaporean economy has been accomplished through
extensive interventionist measures by the government. The government recognizes that
foreign firms are an essential backbone of Singapore economic development, and has
always tried to provide a pro-business environment for them. However, the government
has never forgotten the long-term policy aim, industrial upgrading, even when it reacted
to sudden environmental change. Government policy has in most case been corrective
rather than reactive as seen in the high-wage policy and industrial education promotion.
Telecommunication policy has very effectively worked as one of the incentive
measures for attracting foreign firms. Government has taken a strongly centralized
telecommunication market policy to keep a stable and monopolized industry. Authority
to regulate and operate the industry has been strengthened through every economic
development phase, though this centralized strategy seems contradictory with the world
trend of divestiture of the telecommunication industry. All measures to facilitate
telecommunication infrastructure development have been successfully implemented.
Singapore has succeeded in implementing these policy measures and in providing its
world famous telecommunication infrastructure, which had become a new competitive
advantage for Singapore in attracting foreign firms by the mid-1980s.
IT policy was at first implemented as a part of an industrial upgrading policy.
The government noticed that computerization had a capability to transform an economic
structure itself by enhancing the productivity of workers in every economic sector.
Computerization efforts began at first in the civil service and expanded to include other
sectors in an incessant effort to develop a more integrated information infrastructure.
Success in telecommunication infrastructure development and national
computerization has given Singapore a new economic opportunity. The latest national IT
plan, IT2000, is trying to extend its scope to local industry and ordinary people. IT2000
will be a new engine for economic growth by developing IT awareness and convenience
more broadly into "the rest of the world."
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Chapter Three
Development of Singapore 's computerization policy
3.1. Overview and analytical framework
Computerization policy has played a complementary but very important role in
Singaporean economic development. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
government considered an efficient and productive civil service essential for managing
the state and helping other sectors to survive in a difficult competitive business
environment. The government aimed to demonstrate its seriousness in adapting itself to
the rapidly changing economic environment and in producing industrial development
with its strong leadership. It is interesting and should be noted here that the government
sought to maintain its organizational strength by enhancing its internal efficiency rather
than by expanding its organizational scale. The absolute size of the labor force might
have been too small to allow the government to choose another option. In other words,
inherent constraint on growth in the labor force helped the government concentrate on
productivity enhancement and encouraged the transition of the economic structure into a
more advanced one.
This chapter investigates the institutional framework to form and implement a
national IT policy by looking at the historical practices of IT-relevant organizations. The
Development of Singapore's computerization policy can be divided into three phases: (1)
an effort to computerize internal civil service operations, (2) an effort to create industrial
IT infrastructure through a strong government initiative, and (3) an effort to integrate
whole social and industrial IT infrastructures under a unified NII framework. From a
time series perspective, those three phases correspond to the economic development
periods discussed in the subchapter 2.2.3, 2.2.4, and 2.2.5 respectively. Their
implementation style was very different in each phase. Sometimes Singapore adopted a
top-down style and sometimes a bottom-up one. Even though the Singaporean political
regime is regarded as strictly authoritarian, changes in actual leadership has been
observed very often among relevant parties. This can be said to be one of the
characteristics of national IT policy implementation practices in Singapore. The
following subchapters discuss how those policies have been developed and what kinds of
institutional framework have actually emerged in the course of the development of them.
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3.2. First Phase --- Civil service computerization
3.2.1. The Committee on National Computerization and the establishment
of the National Computer Board
Computerization in the civil service began in 1963 when the first computer was
installed at the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a statutory board under the Ministry of
Labor. Since then, government computerization had been totally led by the Computer
Services Department (CSD) of Ministry of Finance (MOF), even though there were a few
exceptions of independent computer systems development in the Ministry of Education
and Ministry of Defense (MINDEF). In other word, civil service computerization policy
had taken an extremely centralized style controlled by MOF (Koh, et al., 1992).
However, this centralized computerization policy had not succeeded because of the
absolute shortage of computer professionals both inside and outside the MOF.
In 1980, a government initiative to form a centralized national IT policy emerged
as it established a high-level ministerial committee, the Committee on National
Computerization (CNC) in 1980. This was a response to the Singapore Economic
Development Plan for the 1980's compiled by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI),
which pointed out that Singaporean economy needed to be transformed into a more skill-
and knowledge-intensive economy through extensive computerization. CNC was formed
by the permanent secretaries of interested governmental ministries, the chairpersons of
the interested statutory boards, and the presidents of universities. CNC conducted an
extensive study on the current situation of the Singaporean IT industry and the extent of
computerization of the Singaporean economy. In its Report of Committee on National
Computerization (CNC report) in October 1980, the Committee on National
Computerization (CNC) presented initial objectives for CNC in forming a national
computerization policy. The designated objectives were three-fold: the promotion of (1)
extensive civil service computerization, (2) IT education to increase the number of IT
professionals, and (3) IT-related service industry such as the software industry. The
recommendations of the report led to the launch of the Civil Service Computerization
Programme (CSCP) in the following year. The National Computer Board (NCB) was
established as a special statutory board under MOF and was mainly expected to
spearhead the CSCP (NCB, 1981). The board of directors of NCB was formed by the
representatives from various sectors such as the IT industry, universities, and other
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interested statutory boards and ministries to represent various interests in the IT society.6
In its statement issued on the day of establishment, NCB presented above three CNC
designated missions to be carried out. However, the most imminent mission was
apparently to work as an organizer and facilitator of CSCP by overseeing governmental
agencies involved in the CSCP.7
3.2.2. Civil Service Computerization Programme (CSCP)
CSCP changed the process of policy implementation. Before the CSCP, as
discussed above, civil service computerization had been totally led by MOF's centralized
leadership. However, under CSCP, each ministry was now required to have a specialized
section responsible for their own computer systems development. The section, called the
Computer Information Systems Department (CISD), was given responsibility for
developing and managing the ministry's systems development, and for presenting an
appropriate justification of development projects to MOF for getting the projects funded
(Koh et al., 1992).
6 Initial members of the NCB board of directors were formed by the representatives from the Singapore
Computer Society, the National University of Singapore, the Economic Development Board, the Ministry
of Finance, the Ministry of Education, and a proposed Computer Industry Association which represented
software and computer service industry (NCB, 1981).
7 Although this thesis does not mention much about other two missions, IT education and software service
industry development, some facts need to be cited for readers' convenience. An IT education project was
conducted through the creation of educational facilities both inside and outside existing institutions. The
Institute of System Science (ISS) of the National University of Singapore (NUS), the Japan-Singapore
Institute of Software Technology (JSIST), and the Centre for Computer Studies (CCS) of Ngee Ann
Polytechnic are three major IT educational institutions. The Institute of System Science (ISS) later played
a significant role as a collaborator of the Small Enterprise Computerization Programme (SECP). The IT
education project has been very successful. The number of IT professionals increased by tenfold in the
1980's from only 850 in 1980 to 9000 in 1989 (Raman et al., 1991). Generous tax incentives for industrial
upgrading costs (ref. chapter 2) also encouraged IT education. Software industry development was
encouraged both by IT professional education efforts and tax incentives planned by the Economic
Development Board (EDB). The tax incentives were offered selectively to software firms who developed
sophisticated software (Koh et al., 1992).
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The National Computer Board's role was to support each ministry involved in the
Civil Service Computerization Programme (CSCP) by staffing the Computer Information
Systems Departments (CISDs). Top management of Computer Information Systems
Department (CISD) was done by a director selected from the senior administrators of
each ministry, but low-level managers for overseeing every-day operations were sent by
NCB to supplement the absolute lack of computer experts at that time. NCB was also
responsible for reviewing the budget plan submitted by each ministry to the Ministry of
Finance (MOF). It sometimes coordinates various ministries' interests to implement and
materialize those systems development plans effectively under a unified concept (Figure
3.1).
In sum, what the Civil Service Computerization Programme (CSCP) and the
National Computer Board (NCB) brought to civil service computerization was a
combination of a centralized and decentralized policy implementation style (Gurbaxani et
al., 1991). Each ministry became responsible for its own computerization effort. The
National Computer Board (NCB) worked as a supporter and coordinator, but not as an
administrator in the projects. The expert staffing system by NCB succeeded not only in
Figure 3.1: CSCP project implementation framework
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supporting each ministry's effort without dampening the sense of the self-responsibility in
each ministry but in achieving a high economy of scale with the centralized recruiting and
training of computer professionals. The common training of the NCB professionals sent
to each ministry also helped the rapid implementation of CSCP projects. All
methodologies used in CSCP were standardized by NCB, and the dispatched NCB
professionals followed them. This centralized staffing system also helped NCB to
accumulate experience in several different government situations, and consequently to
trace an experience curve to pursue more effective CSCP implementation (Lee, 1988).
The consequences of CSCP were very significant. A cost-benefit analysis
conducted by NCB in 1987 reported that the total computerization expenditure in 1986
was S$77.3 million while the total tangible benefits in the same year amounted to
S$198.3 million (Koh et al., 1992). That gives a return on investment of 171%. From the
manpower point of view, the number of employees in public sectors as a whole has
experienced zero-growth since the launch of the CSCP. The same NCB study reported
that the CSCP resulted in saving 1,398 posts and avoiding 3,264 posts, each amounting to
S$27 million S$48 million annually. New labor needs for operating computer systems
have been met by retraining existing staff and restructuring organizations, not by
replacing or laying off the personnel. The government's attitude as a result yielded
raising productivity among civil servants, and the government has been able to realize the
increase in revenue associated with CSCP. The same 1987 study showed that annual
revenue increase was $119 million.
As described above, the first phase of the computerization effort was oriented to
inside the government. NCB had worked as a good supporter in government
computerization, and in so doing it had accumulated experience in large scale
computerization projects. The authority to direct the computerization projects was
decentralized and rested with each ministry, and NCB concentrated on the centralized
recruitment, education, and staffing of computer professionals. It was this combination
of centralized and decentralized policy implementation styles that led CSCP to be a
tangible success in 1980's
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3.3. Second Phase --- National computerization and multi-agency
collaboration
3.3.1. National IT Plan (NITP)
A second phase of Singaporean computerization policy began with the release of
the National IT Plan (NITP) in 1986, when the government could perceive a gradual
success in telecommunication infrastructure development, industrial upgrading, and
government computerization. NITP is the second national IT policy since the CNC
report in 1980, but it is totally different from its forerunner because it was not initiated by
a top-down process at the a ministerial level but by a spontaneous multi-agency initiative
from interested statutory boards and institutions (Wong, 1992). In fact, spontaneous
discussion for the formation of the NITP commenced in late 1984 by the Economic
Development Board (EDB), the National Computer Board (NCB), the Singapore
Telecom (ST), and the Institute of Systems Science (ISS) of the National University of
Singapore (NUS). The formal working committee for the NITP was set up in early 1985.
An Interim report for NITP was submitted to CNC in late 1985, and the final issue of
NITP was released in late 1986. The first economic recession in 1985 led the NITP to
emphasize its characteristic as a new economic strategy. In fact the benefits productivity
enhancement through investment in IT of all the economic sectors was further
emphasized in the final report (NITP Committee, 1985 and Wong, 1992).
NITP had two designated goals: (1) development of strong export-oriented
industries, and (2) significant improvement of competitiveness and productivity through
the extensive use of IT in all sectors of the economy. Apparently, NITP was no longer
just a computerization policy but an economic policy in a sense that it stated economic
objectives such as industrial productivity enhancement. Another characteristic was that
NITP expressly stated government's intention to intervene into private sectors to promote
IT exploitation in "all sectors of economy."
The implementation strategies proposed in NITP were seven-fold, as shown
below (NITP committee, 1985, and Gurbaxani et al., 1991)
(1) IT Manpower: To develop and educate highly-skilled computer professionals to help
firms to exploit the latest IT applications and products.
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(2) IT Culture: To promote a supportive culture among ordinary citizens for the coming
information economy age.
(3) Information Communication Infrastructure: To develop and maintain the best
telecommunication infrastructure in the world to maintain a competitive advantage in the
information economy age.
(4) IT Application: To facilitate the full exploitation of IT in all economic sectors and
provide appropriate applications for removing barriers for new users of IT.
(5) IT industry: To encourage further IT industry development.
(6) Climate for Creativity and Entrepreneurship: To develop and promote local capability
in IT applied research.
(7) Co-ordination and Collaboration: To unite individual efforts of various organizations
under a new leadership by a new national IT committee, which would be evolved from
the current CNC.
Participation in NITP implementation processes was not limited to EDB, NCB,
ST, and ISS. It was extended to include various sectors such as other governmental
agencies, business associations (chamber of commerce, manufacturer's associations, and
trade associations), professional societies, and IT industry associations. This wide-
ranging multi-agency collaboration was made possible not by the top-down effort from
the CNC. It emerged because each relevant community had more or less the same sense
that they had to cooperate closely with each other otherwise this tiny state couldn't
survive in the competitive world economy. The tiny size of the state and economy also
helped top industry managers and government officials to make an opportunity to meet
with each other often and to form such a common sense of purpose (Wong, 1992). In
addition, there was a custom in the government personnel appointment system that some
top level government officials would experience the top management of various GLCs
and statutory boards in a short period (King, et al., 1990). Close connections among
relevant agencies were established somewhat by such a system. In sum, both the size of
the state and characteristic governmental practices largely was responsible for the
effective implementation of the National IT Plan (NITP).
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Since the wide-ranging multi-agency collaboration had become common,
integrated industrial IT application projects had also become possible. Deployment of
industry-wide IT usage was promoted by the Small Enterprise Computerization
Programme (SECP) and integration of industry-wide IT applications was promoted by
several Electronic Data Interexchange (EDI) projects such as TradeNet. These projects
were undertaken through the multi-agency collaboration which is discussed in more detail
in the following subchapters. Industry-wide IT application projects completed by the
early 1990's and those IT infrastructures had become a new competitive advantage for the
Singaporean economy. The next two subchapters discuss how these two project
approaches had emerged in the National IT Plan (NITP) implementation context.
3.3.2. Small Enterprise Computerization Programme (SECP)
Small Enterprise Computerization Programme (SECP), later renamed Local
Enterprise Computerization Programme (LECP), was an action plan to raise the
productivity and competitiveness of local Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs)
by extensive computerization. Another underlying objective was to encourage
entrepreneurship by enhancing the capability of SMEs to be more innovative and creative
about their business with the use of IT. SECP was launched in 1986 by NCB, the Small
Enterprise Bureau of EDB, and ISS. The Economic Development Board (EDB) had an
incentive in participating in this project because it needed to take a practical action
against the change of the government's policy course after facing serious recession in
1985. The upgrade of the local SMEs, as well as the promotion of high-tech industry and
technology transfer, was one of the imminent missions of the Economic Development
Board (EDB) in its industrial upgrading efforts (ref. chapter 2). The National Computer
Board (NCB) also had an incentive in participating in private sector computerization and
accumulating experience in this field. Thus, the interests of participating parties were
met.
Local SME computerization had hardly progressed when the Small Enterprise
Computerization Programme (SECP) was launched. Civil service computerization had
seen a gradual success thanks to the Civil Service Computerization Programme (CSCP),
and the computerization in large firms, most of which is a multinational company
(MNC), had been also progressed due to then trend of international data networking
among the MNCs. However, SMEs had been given no incentives to promote their
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computerization, and actually had been reluctant to do so because it was too costly. A
study conducted by NCB revealed that 84% of all firms with less than 50 employee did
not have and even did not intend to have computers then. The study also revealed the
causes of the reluctance as follows (Raman, 1988a).
(1) CEO's lack of IT awareness: Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of SMEs were ignorant
of the benefits of IT. They thought that they would be able to manage their businesses
without the help of computerization.
(2) Lack of expertise and support: Most SMEs could simply not afford to develop in-
house IT expertise. Even for those who could afford it, they had given up employing
skilled computer experts because those experts tended to join larger companies.
(3) Rapid innovation of IT products: CEOs of SMEs were confused by the rapid
innovation of IT products, and not able to decide which products they should introduce.
(4) Lack of appreciation of the value of software: CEOs of SMEs did not appreciate the
value of non-material services, such as software, consultation, feasibility studies, and
advisory services.
(5) Lack of absolute financial resources: SMEs did not have the financial resources to
fund computerization, and even had difficulty to getting credit for loans for
computerization investments.
With these problems in mind, the Small Enterprise Computerization Programme
(SECP) incentives were designated as follows (Raman, 1988a and NCB, 1992e).
(1) Education and awareness seminars: The Institute of Systems Science (ISS) conducts a
short-hour seminar for both CEOs and application level professionals
(2) Technical "hand-holding" and advice: A qualified SECP advisor conducts an initial
study for computerization, and advises the CEOs in selecting a consulting firm.
(3) Technical expertise and support: A consulting firm conducts actual feasibility studies
and systems development implementation.
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(4) Financial support: 70% of the SECP advisory fee and the initial services fee by a
consulting firm are subsidized by SECP. 50% of the actual systems development and
implementation fee by a consulting firm or a software house is also subsidized. Loans
are given at a lower interest rate than then market rate for the purchase of hardware and
software.
In order to be eligible for participating in SECP, SMEs were required to have a
minimum 30% local ownership, less than S$8 million of fixed assets, and less than 50
employers except for the case of manufacturing firms.
Thus, SECP had given great incentives for SMEs to proceed with
computerization. Even in the first year of SECP, a large number of SMEs applied to
SECP expecting that they could construct computer systems at much lower costs with
generous financial support. Consequently, NCB had to set up a screening process to limit
the number of those demanding applicants. According to Raman (1988a), the number of
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SECP enrollment was 114 in 1987. Even though precise data about SECP progress is
lacking, Tan (1992) reported that the accumulated number of SMEs which had received
any kind of technical or financial incentives had reached about 200 by 1992 since the
launch of the programme. This data somehow indicates that SECP is a long time process
until accomplished and that the application screening process has more or less been
getting severe as the programme is becoming popular.
As a secondary impact, SECP had helped the healthy growth of software industry,
and consequently contributed to the EDB's policy objective of promoting industrial
upgrading. Even though the exact effect on the growth of the software industry given by
the SECP is difficult to estimate, there is some feedback from industry (Raman, 1988a).
Some consultant firms found it difficult to persuade the CEOs of SMEs, and some
software firms easily tended to just sell their products to the ignorant SMEs. NCB
checked those firms' activities and removed unfavorable firms from the SECP software
consultant firms registry. This point is important because the software firms had not seen
such difficulties so far in the government computerization projects which they were
involved. SECP thus helped both NCB and the software industry to gain experience in
dealing with the reluctant SMEs, and encouraged the proper development of the industry.
In sum, this experience in private sectors greatly helped NCB in planning industry-wide
IT applications such as TradeNet which is discussed in the following section.
3.3.3. TradeNet
Electronic Data Interexchange (EDI) is an international standard for exchanging
various commercial and official document information electronically. TradeNet is
probably one of the most famous EDI applications in the world. In fact, the launch of
TradeNet project was initiated by both NITP and the recession in 1985. As discussed in
the previous chapter, Singaporean economy faced a serious recession in 1985. A high-
level government committee discussed recovery measures, and one of the prioritized
policy goals was the improvement of productivity in external trade processes.
Historically, external trade has taken very unique position in the Singaporean economy.
The volume of the external trade was 3.5 times that of GDP. The government expected
great economic effects in enhancing the trade process productivity with the use of EDI.
In the same year, NITP was formed as explained in the previous subchapter. NITP
expressly stated its aim to facilitate IT use in all economic sectors, and implied the
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government's intention to intervene extensively into private sectors to develop and
implement industry-wide IT applications. Both the government's strong initiative for
economic recovery and the interests of the NITP relevant agencies jointly led to the
launch of the TradeNet project (Neo et al., 1994).
What was the most challenging and at the same time amazing about the TradeNet
was that relevant project participants quickly reached an agreement to change their trade
practices. Trade is a multi-lateral process involving many participants with diversified
interests. Creating an inter-organizational EDI network meant changing business
practices fundamentally. Therefore, the first barrier that had to be surpassed was not
technical but political. Thus, most of the planning efforts were to coordinate the interests
of the participants. NCB and Trade and Development Board (TDB), a statutory board,
played a very important role in this interests coordination process among the project
Figure 3.3: TradeNet committee structure and the implementing framework
Source: King et al. (1990)
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participants. What occurred at first in the project planning process was the high level
agreement among TDB, NCB, and EDB.8 After the quick agreement, they assigned tasks
to each other for the effective implementation of the project. Some personal connections
between the high level officials in TDB, EDB, and NCB encouraged the rapid progress of
this initial planning stage (King et al., 1990). Under the agreement, TDB was given the
task of coordinating the interests of trading community, and therefore NCB could
concentrate on a macro level streamlining study. A number of meetings were held under
the coordination of TDB. Participants included both private and governmental
organizations. After those meetings, agreement was eventually reached among all the
participants.
The progress of the project after the agreement was very rapid. A high level
TradeNet steering committee was first set up with the three sectoral subcommittees under
it (Figure 3.3). NCB IT experts were placed outside the subcommittees and given the
tasks of supporting the technical aspect of the project implementation in each sector and
compiling a realistic integrated plan. Compared with the institutional framework used in
the CSCP (Figure 3.1), the leadership structure had changed. The combined usage of
technical coordination (by NCB) and political coordination (by TDB and the steering
committee) is observed in this TradeNet project implementation framework.
8 As discussed a little in the chapter 2, there is a custom for the government officials to appoint high level
officials to gain experience of acting as the chairperson or other important posts of various statutory boards
or GLCs for a short period. In this case, Yeo Seng Teck, then chairman of TDB, had been the former
chairman of EDB before Philip Yeo, then chairman of both EDB and NCB, became the chairman. So, they
had known each other very well even before meeting and discussing the way to proceed with the TradeNet
project.
45
Functional specifications for the TradeNet had been formed by 1988. Singapore
Network Services (SNS), a state-owned company (SOE) responsible for developing and
operating the TradeNet services, was established in 1988. The Singapore Network
Services (SNS) designed technical specifications for the TradeNet so as to conform to the
international standard of EDIFACT (EDI for Administration, Commerce, and Transport),
and commissioned local software firms to develop software for TradeNet users. Thus,
TradeNet had become operational by early 1989.
The progress of TradeNet deployment was very significant. Partly because TDB
announced that the TradeNet would be mandatory for the trade community at the early
4
Figure 3.4: TradeNet concept model
Source: King et al. (1990)
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stage of its planning,9 TradeNet had captured 95% of all trade document volume and
1,800 subscribers out of 2,200 possible subscribers by mid-1991 (Neo et al., 1994).
Although measurable benefits are hardly estimated, a study in 1993 showed that the
TradeNet reduced the time required to process trade applications from 2-4 days to 15
minutes, and cut the associated documentation costs by 20% or more (Neo et al, 1993b).
Another proof of profitability of the TradeNet is the performance of SNS. SNS reported
that its revenues had grown from S$4 million in 1989 to more than S$20 million in 1992
(Neo et al., 1993b).
The success of the TradeNet induced the emergence of other industry-wide EDI
applications, such as MediNet for the medical industry, LawNet for the legal society, and
BuildNet for the construction industry. These EDI projects enhanced the capability of
NCB in developing the industry-wide IT applications, and at the same time in effectively
coordinating the diversified participants' interests. These successes increased the NCB's
confidence to develop a new, and more integrated national IT policy, called the National
Information Infrastructure (NII). The next subchapter discusses how the NII concept
emerged and how it has been implemented so far.
9 TDB announced its intention to make the TradeNet mandatory for all the trade community by early 1993
in December 1986.
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3.4. Third Phase --- IT2000 and emerging leadership
3.4.1. IT2000 and its project planning process
The nation's third national IT policy, IT2000, emerged as an initiative from NCB.
The necessity for a new national IT plan had been perceived by high-level NCB officials
by early-1990 (Neo et al., 1993a). So, in fact, IT2000 was not a direct policy response to
the Next Lap which was discussed in the pervious chapter. An official announcement for
the launch of the IT2000 planning efforts came shortly after the release of the Next Lap.
NCB was fortunate because it could impress the public that IT2000 was a quick response
of Singaporean IT community to the Next Lap. Unlike the previous two national IT
policy forerunners, IT2000 was solely initiated by NCB. That was possible because NCB
had gained experience and confidence as a systems integrator through the last 10 years of
public and private sector IT projects.
The primary objective of IT2000 was to enhance overall business
competitiveness. NCB, through the NITP implementation effort, had been successful in
developing sectoral IT applications such as the TradeNet; however, there had been almost
no effort to integrate them into more coherent inter-sectoral applications. NCB found a
new economic opportunity in integrating those sectoral applications under a unified
framework, called the National Information Infrastructure (NII).
In 1990, NCB had launched the project internally by first researching the project
planning process itself. NCB regarded such a large scale project would require a new
institutional framework. NCB conducted overseas studies to find an appropriate planning
process, but could not find one as it recognized that there was no forerunner in the world
to such a nation-wide NII project. Consequently, NCB had to develop its own
methodology, and in fact developed it in late-1990. The planning methodology took two
characteristic approaches: demand- or application-driven, and the combination of top-
down and bottom-up approach. These two approaches were developed and introduced
solely based on the business practices in Singapore.
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The organizational framework for planning the IT2000 project began with the
identification of eleven target industry sectors: (1) Construction and Real Estate, (2)
Education, (3) Financial Services, (4) Government, (5) Healthcare, (6) IT Industry, (7)
Leisure and Tourist Services, (8) Manufacturing, (9) Publishing and Media, (10)
Retail/Wholesale/Distribution, and (11) Transportation. The IT2000 steering committee
was set up to oversee all sectoral development efforts. The committee was chaired by the
NCB chairperson, and was comprised of the chairpersons of each sectoral group,
representatives from other governmental agencies, statutory boards, and tertiary
institutions, and the NCB secretariat. Each sectoral group was chaired typically by the
CEO of a relevant industry association and comprised of about fifteen CEOs or senior
managers of both business and government agencies. However, NCB had a right to
select the members of the sectoral groups. NCB in fact selected the members among
CEOs who were supportive of IT implementation (Neo et al., 1993a)
The actual planning process was helped by the strong leadership of NCB. A five-
person support team staffed by NCB personnel worked closely with the chairpersons of
Invite and appoint members
Figure 3.5: IT2000 project planning framework
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each sectoral group to advise them in proceeding with the planning process. Almost all
underlying research was done by the NCB team for each sector. The other members of
the sectoral group simply needed to review the report compiled by the NCB staff at the
group meetings. Partly because the member CEOs were too busy, and partly because
NCB was in a hurry to compile the final IT2000 report, the project planning process
proceeded in a rush. NCB higher officials later confessed that they were in a hurry
because they simply did not want to lose momentum in riding a trend of NII, but another
study evidenced that they simply wanted to present the final plan by the NCB's 10th year
anniversary which would come in several months (Soh et al., 1993). In sum, the planning
period actually given was too short at only several months, during which period NCB
personnel had to work very hard but the other members could not contribute to it very
much. This imbalance in the degree of participation resulted in the NCB's strong
leadership in the IT2000 planning process.
3.4.2. The IT2000 report and a new institutional framework
The interim version of the IT2000 report was submitted to the government in
September 1991, and PM Goh endorsed it at the NCB's 10th year anniversary celebration
held in the same month. The official IT2000 report was made public in April 1992, after
much discussion at the cabinet level to streamline and modify the plan. In the official
version of IT2000, a list of sixty sectoral applications from eleven sectoral groups was
removed because the government regarded that they were so futuristic that they might
give the public too unrealistic expectation. In addition, some societal applications were
added to reflect government's intention to enhance ordinary people's life, which was
expressed in the Next Lap.
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The IT2000 report conceptualized three major components of the NII; Conduit,
Content, and Compute. Figure 3.6 illustrates the concept of Singaporean NII showed in
the report.
(1) Conduit: Physical pipelines that carry information. Examples of it are a
telecommunication or broadcasting facilities.
(2) Content: Information that flows through the conduit.
programs or government documents.
(3) Compute: The processing of the content. Examples
document processing.
Consumer
Business Government
Figure 3.6: Components of the NII
Source: Hu (1993)
Examples of it are multimedia
of it are user authentication or
O3 Compute
Content
Conduit
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IT2000 is the first national IT policy that emphasized the importance of the
"content." The CNC report emphasized the automation of civil service with extensive
ntation
[
Figure 3.7: NITC representation and organizational structure
Source: NCB (1993i)
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al
on
computerization (compute), and the NITP emphasized the integration of those
computerized systems with extensive networking (conduit). Information and media
policy in Singapore had been very restrictive, reflecting Singapore's strict political
authoritarian tradition. All domestic papers and broadcasting media are run by GLCs or
statutory boards, and the government has not yet admitted the establishment of other
media agencies as of 1994. The contents of foreign media are strictly censored, and even
prohibited in Singapore if they violate Singaporean morals or if they explicitly state a
strong criticism against the authoritarian political regime. It is very interesting that NCB
included content as a major component to be promoted and the government approved it. O
Organizational restructuring both inside and outside NCB was done largely by
referring to those three components of NII. Inside NCB, the National Information
Infrastructure Division (NIID) was newly created, and was expected to spearhead NII
application development. Under the NIID, the Planning and Infrastructure Department
(PID) and Application and Promotion Department (APD) were formed. The development
of sectoral applications was led by APD and the development of common network
service and backbone software was led by PID. Outside NCB, the Committee on
National Computerization (CNC) was reconstituted into a new high-level committee,
National Information Technology Committee (NITC) in March 1992 (Figure 3.7). The
members of the newly formed NITC included the representatives from the Ministry of
Communications (MOC), the Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA), and
Singapore Broadcasting Company (SBC). MOC and SBC were expected to account for
"conduit," and MITA for "content." NITC was given the task of overseeing and
coordinating multi-agency efforts.
10 In fact, there is still harsh discussion going on between the IT community such as NCB and other parts
of the government about the liberalization of media regulation. Some proposals have been presented in an
effort to promote the electronic media industry without Singaporean morals deteriorating. However, no
distinctive measure has been implemented so far.
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NCB continued studies on feasible NII applications after the release of the IT2000
report in early 1992, and developed a strategic framework to realize the NII concept as
shown in Figure 3.8 (Chin, 1992). Eight sectoral applications were identified as the
NCB's answer to the NII concept. In the strategic framework, NCB presented the concept
of middleware, which provides the security and reusability part of the network. NIID
accounts for the development of application and middleware service layer, and common
carriers such as ST and SBC account for telecommunication network layer. This
framework seems to follow the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) layered model, but it
is distinctive in that it presented the necessary vertical coverage of the policy and legal
framework layer and the technical standard layer. They are, so to speak, interface layers
with external society. Legal issues such as validity of electronic documents must be
solved and incorporated into the NII framework. Standard issues also must be solved to
assure international connectivity of the Singaporean NII. However, neither Singapore IT
society nor any other part in the world has experienced or presented a clear answer to
them. Those issues will be discussed and studied at NIID, NITC or higher level, and will
Layers to be developed by APD
Layers to be developed by PID
t Layers to be developed by common
.......................... carriers
Figure 3.8: NIl strategic framework
Source: Hu (1994)
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be the hardest part of implementation of the Singaporean NII project.
As discussed above, the emergence of the NI caused a leadership transition again.
The initiative to create the new IT2000 project solely emerged from NCB. Leadership
had been totally held by NCB during the policy planning period; however, after the
policy became public, the gigantic scale of the project required the emergence of higher
level leadership and coordination. Thus NITC was formed and the leadership was
integrated into higher levels. More stakeholders had become able to represent their
interests in NITC, but private sector participation on the contrary might be limited by this
leadership transition.
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3.5. Conclusion for chapter 3
In conclusion, a national IT policy in Singapore has taken various implementation
styles in each phase. The first IT policy, the CNC report was formed as a part of
economic policy with the top-down process from the government, and actually
implemented by NCB. The second IT policy, the NITP, was spontaneously formed by
interested agencies. This had been made possible because underlying IT manufacturing
and telecommunication infrastructure policy had shown a considerable success by the
time of policy formation. The implementation of NITP was done by the extensive
collaborative effort of the interested agencies; however, participation in it had been
gradually extended to other sectors including private sector. The third IT policy, the
IT2000, was initiated and formed under the strong leadership of NCB. This was made
possible because NCB have gained much experience in both public and private sector
computerization projects in the previous period. However, the huge size of IT2000
project required the emergence of higher level governmental leadership again. This led to
the creation of NITC which will work as an absolute authority until this huge NII project
is actually materialized in the 21st century.
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Chapter Four
Econometric analysis of the construction industry,
productivity, and computerization
4.1. Methodology and basic assumptions
This chapter investigates the influences of construction industry productivity
enhancement on the national economy by using an econometric technique. Establishing a
feasible econometric model is difficult. Investment in telecommunication or
computerization is an important input to the national economy as they contribute to the
economy as a productivity enhancer rather than just as consumption goods. Many
econometricians and statisticians have tried to establish a feasible econometric model
picking telecommunication or informatization factors as independent variables and
economic output as a dependent variable. However, their efforts have not been able to
explain this causal relationship. Some econometric studies explored the relationship of
the economy as an input and telecommunication or computerization as an output
(Saunders et al., 1994). They have failed to find significant causal relationships because
the situations in which telecommunication or computerization is used as a efficiency
enhancer are too complex and varied by each country to be generalized. Some empirical
studies have shown the latter relationships but they are less useful in the economic
development context because they do not explain any causal relationships but focus
instead on the statistical joint variation of each variable. Even if we concentrate on a
particular sectoral study, the causal relationships are difficult to investigate because actual
data about IT investment and telecommunication consumption are generally lacking or
confidential. In the Singaporean construction industry case, there is some numerical data
from the Department of Statistics (DOS) (1992) or the National Computer Board (NCB)
(1994i), but they are isolated data at a given time and not suitable for econometric
analysis. Another difficulty is how to incorporate other factors into the econometric
model of productivity. Industrial productivity enhancement involves many factors such
as technological progress, wage control, and process automation. Obtaining these data
numerically is a way which can be meaningfully aggregated and combined, is a very
challenging task, and beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, the influence of
technological progress on industrial efficiency varies by applied technology, and
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productivity enhancement occurs as a result of overall industrial process reengineering
including the technology applied and process automation. This complexity is one of the
reasons that there have not been any established econometric model directly connecting
technological investment or training factor to the industrial productivity.
Given this constraint, this chapter attempts to establish an econometric reference
model for measuring the dependency of the national economy on construction industry
productivity enhancement, using industry time series data Basic assumptions used in the
analysis are illustrated in Figure 4.1. To focus the discussion, this chapter investigates
the relationships drawn by a thick arrow in the figure. First, the subchapter 4.2 examines
the effect of the number of computer and technical professionals on the industrial
/~~~~~~
Construction industry
capital formation I
Other industry
capital formation
Construction
industry's manpower
Productivity
enhancement I
: Relations to be simulated
in this chapter
-*i : Relations to be omitted in
this chaDter
Computerization I Technical
manpower
Production process Other factors (wage
automation control, etc.)
Figure 4.1: Basic assumptions for the econometric analysis of factors affecting national
construction industry productivity growth
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productivity. Second, the subchapter 4.3 examines the effect of productivity
enhancement on industrial output, which is measured by the fixed capital formation
added by the construction industry. Finally, the subchapter 4.4 examines the dependency
of the national economy on the construction industry output. The data used are time
series data obtained from annual publications of industry data. Because computerization
in the industry began just a decade ago, the number of data points may not be enough to
ignore the possibility of a statistical discrepancy. In this chapter, such discrepancies are
treated solely based on the econometric theory.
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4.2. Computerization and productivity enhancement
As discussed in the previous subchapter, the causes of productivity enhancement
are very complex. They involve various technological as well as non-technological
factors. Therefore, if we were to construct an accurate econometric model representing
all the factors involved, the formula would be very long and complex. Furthermore, it is
very difficult to obtain all the numerical data. For example, organizational restructuring
or technical education may largely affect industrial productivity, but a quantitative
measure of them hardly appears as numerical statistics. To simplify discussion, this
subchapter concentrates on the effect of technological factors on productivity. Computer
installation statistics are selected for measuring the degree of computerization, and the
ratio of technical staffs to all the industry's employees are selected for measuring the
degree of technical concentration in the industrial process. They are available on a time
series basis and are shown in Figure 4.2. Computer installation statistics are drawn from
a study conducted by the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) in 1992
(Chow, 1992). Industry manpower statistics are drawn from the national manpower
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Figure 4.2: Computerization in the construction industry
Source: Chow (1992) and DOS (monthly)
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census, and the ratio of technical and professional staffs to the all industrial employees
are calculated based on them (DOS, monthly).
In constructing an econometric formula to be estimated, this subchapter assumes
that computer installation variables follow an exponential path while other variables
follow a linear path. This assumption is plausible because computer installation appears
to grow exponentially as observed in Figure 4.2 while it is impossible for the ratio of
technical staffs to grow exponentially. Productivity index may or may not follow the
linear path but observation from Figure 4.3 lets us conclude that linear representation is
appropriate. Thus, the assumed model takes a semilog form as follows.
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Figure 4.3: Construction industry productivity
Source: DOS (annual)
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PRDIDX = a + bl 1 In MICRO + b2 * In MINI + b3 PPAR
Where: PRDIDX:
MICRO:
Construction productivity index (1978=100)
Number of microcomputer installation
D
0
0
o
o
o
O
0
- RESIDUAL - PRDIDX --- FITTEDI
Figure 4.4: Regression results of formula (4.1)
Table 4.1: Regression results of formula (4.1)
LS // Dependent Variable is PRDIDX
SMPL range: 1978 - 1991
Number of observations: 14
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 106.22972 8.1541634 13.027666 0.000
LNMICRO 2.6613804 2.6788709 0.9934710 0.344
LNMINI 4.8461140 3.3409484 1.4505205 0.178
PPAR 0.9155112 1.4444302 0.6338217 0.540
R-squared 0.936253 Mean of dependent 140.2472
Adjusted R-squared 0.917129 S.D. of dependent 20.63210
S.E. of regression 5.939442 Sum of squared resid 352.7698
Durbin-Watson stat 1.434187 F-statistic 48.95654
Log likelihood -42.45245
________________________________________________________________
62
(4.1)
_
1
-1
-1
MINI:
PPAR:
Number of minicomputer installation
Ratio of professional and technical staffs to all the
construction industry employees
Regression is conducted with the ordinary least squares (OLS) scheme and the
results are shown in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1. Simulated equation for formula (4.1) is
- RESIDUAL - PRDIDX --- FITTED
Figure 4.5: Regression results of formula (4.3)
Table 4.2: Regression results of formula (4.3)
LS // Dependent Variable is PRDIDX
SMPL range: 1978 - 1991
Number of observations: 14
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 112.60833 2.7366008 41.148982 0.000
LNMINI 8.4177761 0.6852626 12.284015 0.000
R-squared 0.926334 Mean of dependent 140.2472
Adjusted R-squared 0.920195 S.D. of dependent 20.63210
S.E. of regression 5.828523 Sum of squared resid 407.6602
Durbin-Watson stat 1.302514 F-statistic 150.8970
Log likelihood -43.46478
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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thus as follows.
PRDIDX = 106.23 + 2.66 In MICRO + 4.84 In MINI + 0.92 PPAR (4.2)
(13.03) (0.99) (1.45) (0.63)
The values inside the parenthesis are a t-statistic.l l In fact, the t-statistics do not
show a significantly high confidence level about the null hypothesis that each individual
coefficient is zero. The two-tailed significance probability (2-TAIL SIG.) in Table 4.1
indicates the confidence level at the given degree of freedom (df)12 in this regression.
Thus, the confidence level at which we can reject the null hypothesis is calculated as
follows.
In MICRO: 1 - 0.344 = 0.656 = 65.6 (%)
In MINI: 1 - 0.178 = 0.822 = 82.2 (%)
PPAR: 1 - 0.540 = 0.460 = 46.0 (%)
As noted, these values are not statistically significant. For example, the
coefficient for PPAR is not zero at only 46% confidence level and it may become zero in
other 54% of probability in the course of regression. However, we can not conclude that
all the coefficients are jointly zero because the F-statistic13 in Table 4.1 shows a relatively
significant level at 48.96. The critical value for F-statistic at the given degree of freedom
is 6.55 at 99% confidence level (Pindyck et al. 1991). Because 48.96>6.55, we can reject
the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are jointly zero at 99% confidence level.
Furthermore, when we look at the R2 and adjusted R2 in the table, 14 we can conclude that
11 The t-statistic shows the confidence level in which each individual independent variable is not zero.
Usually, t-statistic of less than 2 (95% confidence level) is considered less significant.
12 Degree of freedom (df) in the econometric regression means statistical freedom in calculating regression
coefficients. When the size of samples is N and the number of independent variables including a constant
term in the estimated formula is k, the degree of freedom is given by N-k.
13 The F-statistic shows the confidence level in which all the independent variables are jointly not zero. If
F-statistic is larger than the critical value at the given degree of freedom, we reject the null hypothesis that
all the independent variables are jointly zero.
14 The R2 and adjusted R2 both show the degree in which all involved independent variables as a whole
explain the variation of the dependent variable in the regression. R2 of close to 1 means that fitted values
have a small difference from the actual values. Therefore R2 is often used to measure the regression's
"goodness of fit" to the actual data.
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the simulated formula is well fitted to the actual movement of the dependent variable
(PRDIDX), because they are well close to 1 at 0.93 and 0.92 respectively.
Next, the validity of the model itself needs to be examined. As we investigated
the individual t-statistics, individual coefficients can not show that it is far from zero at a
significant confidence level. We test the null hypothesis that two less significant
coefficients, those of LNMICRO and PPAR, are jointly zero. The restricted model
follows.
PRDIDX = a + b2 ° In MINI (4.3)
The regression results of this restricted model are shown in Figure 4.5 and Table
4.2. The F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients of omitted
variables are jointly zero is calculated as follows (Pindyck et al., 1991).
Fq, N-k = (ESSR -ESSUR) / q (4.4)
ESSUR / (N - k)
Where: ESSR: Sum of squared residuals in the restricted model
ESSUR: Sum of squared residuals in the unrestricted model
q: Number of omitted variables
N: Number of samples
k: Number of explanatory variables including the constant
term in the unrestricted model.
From Table 4.1 and 4.2, ESSR and ESSUR are read as 407.66 and 352.77
respectively. Two variables are omitted in the restricted model, then q=2. From the
original model specification, N=14 and k=4. Hence, the F-statistic is calculated as
follows.
F 10 = (407.66- 352.77) / 2 0.78
352.77 /10
The critical value for the F-statistic at the given degree of freedom is 4.10 at 95%
confidence level. Because 0.78<4.10, we accept the null hypothesis that those two
variables are jointly zero and the restricted model is more plausible.
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Finally, a serial correlation15 and heteroskedasticityl6 in a residual term need to be
examined. In the Figure 4.4, heteroskedasticity is observed, but it is hard to tell whether
serial correlation is present from the figure.
To check the presence of heteroskedasticity, the White test is conducted on the
original model (Pindyck et al., 1991). In the White test, the squares of residuals from
original regression are regressed by all the independent variables and squares and cross
products of them. Then, the formula to be estimated becomes as follows.
S2 = a + bl In MICRO + b2 · In MINI + b3 PPAR
+ b4 *In MICRO · In MINI + b5 * In MICRO · PPAR
+ b6 ° In MINI PPAR
+ b7 * (ln MICRO) 2 + b8 * (ln MINI) 2+ b9 · (PPAR)2 (4.5)
Where: g2 : Squared residuals in the original model
15 When adjacent residual values have some relations over a regression, the residual is said to have a serial
correlation. In general, a time series data tends to have the serial correlation because a data at a given time
somehow tends to affect the subsequent data over time.
16 When the magnitude of residual values are not uniform over samples, the residual is said to have a
heteroskedasticity.
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If the product of R2 in this regression and the number of samples, i.e., N.R2 , is
more than the critical value of the X2 distribution at the given degree of freedom, we
reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and have to correct the model with an
appropriate heteroskedascity correction scheme. The results of the regression for the
formula (4.5) are shown in Table 4.3. R2 from this regression is 0.90 and N is 14 as
before. Then, N-R2=12.6 while the critical value of X2 distribution at the given degree
of freedom (in this case, the number of independent variables in the formula (4.5)) is
92=14.68 at 90% confidence level. Because 12.6<14.68, we accept the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity and we do not conduct a heteroskedasticity correction.
For the serial correlation, the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) is used to judge the
existence of them. Pindyck et al. (1991) gives the upper (d,) and lower (dl ) critical
values for DW at the given degree of freedom. From Table 4.1, DW=1.43 while the
critical values are excerpted from Pindyck et al. (1991) as d =1.75 and d/=0.82 at N=15
and k=3. Because d <DW< d,, the results are inconclusive and we are not sure whether
there is a serial correlation in this regression.
In sum, the regression of the assumed model apparently gives a significant result.
Table 4.3: Regression results of formula (4.5)
LS // Dependent Variable is RESIDSQ
SMPL range: 1978 - 1991
Number of observations: 14
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 537.23441 169.01273 3.1786624 0.034
LNMICRO 691.54598 553.15303 1.2501893 0.279
LNMINI -720.24208 582.46040 -1.2365511 0.284
PPAR -115.46328 57.357282 -2.0130536 0.114
SQLNMICR -404.00271 266.87266 -1.5138408 0.205
SQLNMINI -647.47660 440.56170 -1.4696616 0.216
SQPPAR 4.3218454 5.0880471 0.8494114 0.444
LNMCPPAR -1.7710929 28.138538 -0.0629419 0.953
LNMNPPAR 13.618591 37.273553 0.3653687 0.733
LNMNLNMC 985.59554 661.48130 1.4899825 0.210
R-squared 0.899849 Mean of dependent 25.19784
Adjusted R-squared 0.674509 S.D. of dependent 35.37074
S.E. of regression 20.17964 Sum of squared resid 1628.872
Durbin-Watson stat 1.968739 F-statistic 3.993300
Log likelihood -53.16124
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Although there is still some room for refining the model, the F-test from the assumed
model shows the computer installation statistics explains the productivity growth while
microcomputer installation is less significant. Usually a minicomputer is used as a host
in a computer network, but a microcomputer is used on a stand-alone basis in most cases.
Considering this point, we can conclude that the installation of networked computers
somehow affect the productivity enhancement in the industry while that of stand-alone-
basis computers does not much. Increase in technical staffs is least significant in the
assumed model and may be irrelevant to the productivity growth. However, room for
further discussion remains because the number of data points is few and the data are
picked on a time series basis. Cross sectoral study inside the industry is required for a
more accurate estimation of the causal relationship.
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4.3. Productivity enhancement and industrial output
There are two indicators for measuring the construction industry output. A rather
general one is value added to national GDP by the industry. Another one is the national
capital formation added by construction. Capital formation generally means the purchase
of durable goods by industries or individuals. However, the outputs of construction, i.e.
buildings, are also generally accounted as capital formation because they namely work as
a capital asset in the nation's economic activity. This subchapter picks capital formation
as a construction industry output indicator and investigates the effect of productivity
enhancement on it.
The historical change of construction manpower and productivity is shown in
Figure 4.6, and that of capital formation by the construction industry is in Figure 4.7. As
discussed in the previous subchapter, productivity is assumed to grow linearly. Capital
formation apparently follows the exponential path as observed in Figure 4.7. It is hard to
tell whether construction manpower follows a linear or exponential path from Figure 4.6,
but it is assumed that the construction manpower growth follows the linear path in this
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Figure 4.6: Construction manpower and productivity change
Source: DOS (annual) and DOS (monthly)
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subchapter. As observed in Figure 4.6, construction manpower has hardly grown
exponentially historically. Furthermore, construction is still a very labor-intensive
industry, and as discussed in chapter two, Singapore has always suffered from a severe
labor shortage. For these reasons, this subchapter assumes that construction manpower
growth follows the linear path. Given these assumptions, the regression model to be
estimated takes the semilog form again as follows.
In CCF = a + bl CLALL + b2 · PRDIDX (4.6)
Where: CCF:
CLALL:
PRDIDX:
Capital formation added by the construction industry
Construction industry manpower
Construction productivity index (1978=100)
Results of the regression for formula (4.6) are shown in Figure 4.8 and Table 4.4.
Thus, the simulated equation for formula (4.6) becomes as follows.
In CCF = 6.42 + 0.0043 CLALL
(9.77) (0.58)
+ 0.0145 PRDIDX
(1.87)
From the t-statistics observed, the confidence levels at which we can conclude the
coefficients for each variable are not individually zero are calculated as follows.
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Figure 4.7: Capital formation by the construction industry
Source: Ofori (1993)
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(4.7)
CLALL: 1 - 0.571 = 0.429 = 42.9 (%)
PRDIDX: 1 - 0.088 = 0.912 = 91.2 (%)
The effect of productivity on capital formation is not zero over the regression at
I RESIDUAL LNCCF - FITTED|
Figure 4.8: Regression results of formula (4.6)
Table 4.4: Regression results of formula (4.6)
LS // Dependent Variable is LNCCF
SMPL range: 1978 - 1991
Number of observations: 14
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 6.4241388 0.6572306 9.7745585 0.000
CLALL 0.0043063 0.0073760 0.5838165 0.571
PRDIDX 0.0145471 0.0077822 1.8692826 0.088
R-squared 0.644660 Mean of dependent 8.832008
Adjusted R-squared 0.580053 S.D. of dependent 0.476644
S.E. of regression 0.308881 Sum of squared resid 1.049481
Durbin-Watson stat 0.482342 F-statistic 9.978142
Log likelihood -1.729808
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _
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over a 90% confidence level, but that of construction manpower is not zero only at less
than the 50% of confidence level. On the other hand, from the F-statistic observed (9.98),
we can conclude that both variables are not jointly zero at 99% confidence level, since the
critical value of F-statistic at the given degree of freedom is excerpted from Pindyck et al.
(1991) as F2,11=7.21. In terms of the goodness of fit, R2 and adjusted R2 indicate 0.68
and 0.62 respectively. They are not significantly close to 1 but it can be said that the
simulated equation is reasonably fitted to actual data.
Although the residual plot in Figure 4.8 does not show any significant
heteroskedasticity, the White test should be conducted for checking the necessity of the
heteroskedasticity correction on the regression. Following equation is constructed for the
White test.
S2 = a + bl CLALL + b2 · PRDIDX + b3 · CLALL- PRDIDX
+ b4 (CLALL) 2 + b5 · (PRDIDX) 2 (4.8)
Regression results for formula (4.8) is shown in Table 4.5. R2 shows 0.37 then
N-R2 is calculated as 14.0.37=5.18. Since the critical value of the x2 distribution at
given degree of freedom is 52=11.07 at a 95% confidence level, we accept the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity and do not apply the heteroskedasticity correction.
Table 4.5: Regression results of formula (4.8)
LS // Dependent Variable is RESIDSQ
MPL range: 1978 - 1991
Number of observations: 14
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C -2.3549248 1.7818104 -1.3216473 0.223
CLALL -0.0117559 0.0398975 -0.2946533 0.776
PRDIDX 0.0450907 0.0449341 1.0034862 0.345
SQCLALL 0.0000138 0.0001221 0.1127710 0.913
SQPRDIDX -0.0001873 0.0002516 -0.7441738 0.478
CLALLPRD 0.0000617 0.0003747 0.1646822 0.873
R-squared 0.368750 Mean of dependent 0.074963
Adjusted R-squared -0.025782 S.D. of dependent 0.076630
S.E. of regression 0.077611 Sum of squared resid 0.048188
Durbin-Watson stat 1.143186 F-statistic 0.934652
Log likelihood 19.83674
72
On the other hand, the presence of a serial correlation is possible since the
residual plot in Figure 4.8 strongly suggests it. DW in Table 4.4 is 0.48 while the critical
I RESIDUAL LNCCF -- FITTED
Figure 4.9: Regression result after serial correlation correction (formula (4.9))
Table 4.6: Regression result after serial correlation
LS // Dependent Variable is LNCCF
SMPL range: 1981 - 1991
Number of observations: 11
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations
correction (formula (4.9))
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 11.804802 1.0792904 10.937559 0.000
CLALL(-1) 0.0044070 0.0022899 1.9244818 0.096
PRDIDX(-2) -0.0205685 0.0067374 -3.0528604 0.019
AR(1) 0.6378082 0.0881158 7.2382988 0.000
R-squared 0.830766 Mean of dependent 9.043828
Adjusted R-squared 0.758238 S.D. of dependent 0.220801
S.E. of regression 0.108566 Sum of squared resid 0.082506
Durbin-Watson stat 1.840711 F-statistic 11.45431
Log likelihood 11.30193
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
73
values are excerpted from Pindyck et al. (1991) as d =1.54 and d=0.95 at N=15 and
k=2. As DW<d,, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Then,
some form of serial correlation correction needs to be applied. Some variables taking lag
form are introduced for checking the presence of distributed lags in the disturbance term
of the original model. After many trials, the following corrected model is constructed for
taking the lags and serial correlation into account.
In CCF = a + bl * CLALLt_l + b2 PRDIDXt 2 (4.9)
The subscript t-i means that past i year's data for each individual variable is taken
in the regression. Furthermore, Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is introduced to correct a first
order serial correlation in the residual term (Pindyck et al., 1991). The regression result is
in Figure 4.9 and Table 4.6.17 Coefficients for CLALLt_l and PRDIDXt 2 indicate high
t-statistics. The F-statistic of 11.45 indicates that both variables are significantly different
from zero (since the critical value at the given degree of freedom is F2,11=7.21 at 99%
confidence level). DW of 1.84 indicates that there is no longer a serial correlation in the
residual term since d =1.75 and dr=0.82 at k=3 and N=15, and DW>du in this case.
When we look at the coefficients in the corrected model, we find some interesting
facts. Productivity improvement of two years ago affects the current capital formation
output negatively, which means the increase in the productivity index of 1 unit results in
2% decrease in the output at two years later (since coefficient is -0.02). Furthermore,
increase in the construction manpower of 1000 people has little effect on the next year's
output since coefficient is very small at 0.004.
In overall, if we compare the results from formula (4.6) and (4.9), we conclude
that current productivity change has some immediate effect on current construction
output if we do not take the presence of the serial correlation in the disturbance term into
account. In the corrected model, we conclude that neither of productivity nor manpower
increase affects the construction output. Thus, room for discussion remains in the source
of the strong serial correlation. The necessity of the serial correlation correction indicates
that it must exist but it is hard to conclude it only from the models specified in this
17 Coefficient for the AR(1) term indicates the correlation between adjacent disturbances term, and that
coefficient of close to 1 indicates the presence of the positive serial correlation in the regression.
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subchapter. Time series data tends to have a serial correlation as its nature. As discussed
in the previous subchapter, cross sectoral study with larger sample is necessary for
concluding this point.
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4.4. National economy's dependency on construction industry output
This subchapter investigates more historical characteristic of Singaporean
economy. It is assumed that the nation's economic output is formed purely by its capital
and labor. In addition, it is also assumed that national economy as a whole follows the
Cobb-Douglas production function form in yielding the output. For checking the
economy's dependency especially on the construction industry, only capital input from
the construction industry is picked. Thus the model to be estimated follows.
GDPCR = a * MPALLbl CCFb2 (4.10)
Where: GDPCR:
MPALL:
CCF:
Gross domestic products in current price
Number of all industrial manpower
Capital formation added by the construction industry
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Taking the natural logarithm of both hands yields the following linear form.
In GDPCR = a + bl * In MPALL + b2 * In CCF
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
19'65 1970 1975 1980
.-- -.-- . . . 9 8 .
1990
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
I- RESIDUAL - LNGDPCR -- FITTEDI
Figure 4.11: Regression results of formula (4.11)
Table 4.7: Regression results of formula (4.11)
LS // Dependent Variable is LNGDPCR
MPL range: 1964 - 1991
Number of observations: 28
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 2.3550550 0.4821128 4.8848626 0.000
LNMPALL 0.3712475 0.1789087 2.0750665 0.048
LNCCF 0.6221679 0.1014574 6.1323045 0.000
R-squared 0.968975 Mean of dependent 9.659217
Adjusted R-squared 0.966493 S.D. of dependent 1.023845
S.E. of regression 0.187413 Sum of squared resid 0.878091
Durbin-Watson stat 0.190337 F-statistic 390.4048
Log likelihood 8.740662
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
77
(4.11)
_·
............................................................ ..........
Z__s 0=1% - ----------7
,\ .................................. .. ... ....... .............. ......../
J.~~~
/~c~-le,"-\-
m
m
· 1!8·1 985
m I
This model again may or may not be appropriate because the previous subchapter
assumed that construction manpower growth follows the linear path. Consistency of the
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Figure 4.12: Regression results of formula (4.11) after the inclusion of AR(1) term
Table 4.8: Regression results of formula (4.11) after the inclusion of AR(1) term
LS // Dependent Variable is LNGDPCR
SMPL range: 1965 - 1991
Sample endpoints adjusted to exclude missing data
Number of observations: 27
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C -140.72425 4136.7619 -0.0340180 0.973
LNCCF 0.1978303 0.0489673 4.0400481 0.001
LNMPALL 0.2538168 0.0839436 3.0236577 0.006
AR(1) 1.0005010 0.0144224 69.371390 0.000
R-squared 0.998619 Mean of dependent 9.724131
Adjusted R-squared 0.998439 S.D. of dependent 0.982879
S.E. of regression 0.038834 Sum of squared resid 0.034686
Durbin-Watson stat 1.245112 F-statistic 5544.079
Log likelihood 51.56173
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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model is still not clear but as far as we observe on Figure 4.10, it is not so inappropriate
to assume that national manpower as a whole grows exponentially. To follow the classic
form of the Cobb-Douglas production function, this subchapter stays on assuming the
model defined in formula (4.10) and (4.11).
The regression results for formula (4.1 1) is in Table 4.7. From the coefficients in
the table, the simulated equation is constructed as follows.
In GDPCR = 2.36 + 0.37 * In MPALL + 0.62 * In CCF (4.12)
(4.88) (2.07) (6.13)
The t-statistics for each coefficient are very significant at above 2. Two-tailed
significance probability in the table shows both coefficients are not individually zero at
95% confidence level. The F-statistic is also significant at 390.41. Because the critical
value of the F-statistic is F2,25 =5.57 at a 99% confidence level, it is highly plausible that
both variables are not jointly zero. The R2 and adjusted R2 also show the high degree of
the goodness of fit to the actual value at 0.97 for both terms. However, the DW is very
low at 0.19, which suggests the existence of a serial correlation in the residual term.
Then, model modification needs to be made for the serial correlation correction.
Model modification is conducted on a trial-and-error basis; therefore, the process
itself may not be accurate. After some trials, it is concluded that the inclusion of AR(1)
term in the regression simply solves the problem. The regression results are in Figure
4.12 and Table 4.8. All the t-statistics, F-statistic, and R2 are improved with the new
regression, but the new DW of 1.25 suggests that we are still inconclusive about the
existence of a serial correlation (since d =1.65 and d=1.16 at N=27 and k=3, then
dl<DW< d ).
In sum, capital formation added by construction strongly affects the national
GDP. The sum of the coefficients for each variable is almost 1 (constant return to scale)
in the original model and far less than 1 (decreasing return to scale) in the corrected
model. Because the model specification is still primitive, there still must be the source of
serial correlation in those models. The high coefficient for AR(1) in the corrected model
strongly suggests this point. Only we can conclude from these regression results is that
the capital formation by construction positively affects the national economy. However,
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its effect does not exceed 20% per unit output increase since the coefficient of LNCCF is
0.20 and it will decrease when we add new variables in the original model.
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4.5. Conclusion for chapter 4
Three econometric models are tested for measuring the effect of computerization
in the construction industry on the national economy. Although the model specification
employed is still primitive, they suggest some noticeable results. The first regression
result suggests that the installation of minicomputer somehow improves the overall
construction productivity but microcomputer installation and increase in technical staffs
have little effect on the productivity improvement. The second regression result suggests
that the productivity improvement somehow affects the industry's output following a fair
amount of the lag. However, the influence is very small as far as the regression results
indicate. Third, and consistent with the initial premise of this thesis, the regression result
suggests that the construction industry output plays a very significant role in the national
economic development.
For all of the three models estimated, a more refined model specification is
necessary for a more accurate estimation. Because the data regressed in this subchapter is
time series data, the data is expected to contain a great deal of serial correlation. The
number of data points is also a problem. Economic and computerization statistics are
available only on an annual basis, and the publication of productivity and
computerization data began only a decade ago. Room for discussion remains in assessing
both the accuracy of the model specification and the statistical discrepancy resulting from
a little amount of data.
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Chapter Five
The Construction Industry and Information Technology
5.1. Overview and analytical framework
This chapter investigates the influence of IT on the construction industry and
assesses the potential of a proposed integrated construction industry network, the
Construction and Real Estate Network (CORENET). CORENET is one of the main
components of Singaporean NII, as is discussed in the chapter three. Its primary
functional purpose is to reduce transaction time required for the exchange of various
information among construction relevant parties, by integrating and standardizing
exchange processes and data formats under a unified framework.
In addition, it is the only "industrial" IT application presented under the IT2000
Nl concept. Preceding industrial IT applications such as the TradeNet have met great
success, by riding effectively on the trend of the strategic economic plan at the late 1980s.
However, the inclusion of CORENET in the IT2000 plan is not a result of such a trend.
In fact, the economic plan for 1990s, called the Next Lap, aims to make Singapore a
financial and information center in the Southeast Asia. In sum, its aim is the
informatization of the economy rather than industrial promotion. Although construction
still takes up an important part of industrial output in the economy as discussed in chapter
four, the growth trend is going downward recently and construction is now regarded as a
sun-set industry among economic sectors. In sum, this particular effort to revitalize the
construction industry did not come from the strategic promotional effort at a national
level. Rather, it emerged when industry leaders perceived that the construction industry
was far behind other industries in terms of productivity and computerization.
CORENET is facing some difficulties which other industries have not met yet in
their effort to implement a large scale computerization project. To analyze the problems
and potentials of the proposed integrated network, this chapter takes the three-step
approach. First, it examines the characteristics of professional practices in the industry
and environmental thrusts faced by the industry. Second, it describes how the IT has
been implemented in those practices. Finally, it analyzes technical and non-technical
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problems in implementing such an integrated network, and considers some possible
measures to correct those problems.
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5.2. Professional practice and current environmental thrusts for the
industry
5.2.1. Institutional and regulatory framework
Unlike manufacturing, construction is a very dispersed and discontinuous process
involving many participants. Industrial practices are illustrated briefly in Figure 5.1.
Once a contract on a particular construction project is made between a client and
contractor, several pieces of information must be exchanged among various practitioners.
(International)
Figure 5.1: Professional practice and institutional framework in the construction industry
Source: Lim (1993) and Ofori (1994)
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The contractor consults outside technical specialists to do the most of technical part of the
construction works such as planning, designing and building. Those specialists include
architects, quantity surveyors (QS), engineers, and other consultants in various fields.
The technical firms also must have a connection with the client to exchange information
about actual technical requirements and production information on the project. The
contractor must submit an application to a development control agency to obtain a
permission to develop a particular portion of a land. The land to be developed also has to
be registered in a registry in the Ministry of Law (MinLaw). The technical firms must
follow the technical regulations set by building control agencies. They must refer to
those technical regulations from the various agencies at the same time before deciding on
the final architectural design. They then must submit an application to those different
agencies depending on relevant technical fields (electricity, gas, structural safety, etc.) to
obtain approvals for conforming the regulation. More technically specific information
also must be exchanged among the technical firms to allow the architects to come up with
an actual production design under a unified project concept. However, those technical
information is in very dispersed forms when it comes to the contractors. It is often
inconsistent with each other because information exchange channels in those practices are
so complicated.
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Other than those practical participants, there is another agency for industrial
development, which is characteristic in the Singaporean construction industry. The
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) is a statutory board under the Ministry
of National Development (MND), and responsible for industrial upgrade and the overall
Table 5.1: Relevant parties involved in the construction industry practice
Agencies or Description
organizations
Ministry of National Government ministry responsible for the development of public
Development infrastructure and land development. It funds CIDB, URA, PUB,
(MND) HDB, and PWD.
Ministry of Law Government ministry responsible for legal affairs. All national
(MinLaw) land must be registered in a registry in the MinLaw.
Construction Statutory board under MND responsible for the development and
Industry technical upgrade of the industry. Conducts the qualification of
Development Board contractors and the technical standardization of design and
(CIDB) production processes. Also responsible for construction export
promotion and construction R&D.
Urban Development control agency under MND responsible for a land
Redevelopment management, especially concerning the conservation of historic
Authority (URA) sites and environmental protection.
Housing and Statutory board under MND responsible for the provision of
Development Board public housing.
(HDB)
Public Utility Board Statutory board under MND responsible for the construction of
(PUB) public utility such as gas, water, and electricity. PUB is expected
to be privatized in 1995. It stipulates technical regulations
regarding the installation of public utility facilities in every
building and construction work.
Public Works Building control agency under MND responsible for other public
Department (PWD) construction works and civil engineering projects. It stipulates
technical regulations regarding the safety of buildings in public
projects
Fire Safety Bureau Department under the Singapore Civil Defense Forces (SCDF)
(FSB) responsible for the technical regulation for the fire safety of every
building in Singapore.
Singapore Trade association of local contractors. Foreign contractors are
Contractors given associate membership.
Association Limited
(SCAL)
Singapore Institute Trade association of local architects. It stipulates the
of Architects (SIA) architectural standards to be followed in a planning and design
process.
Institution of Trade association of construction engineers. It holds several
Engineers Singapore conferences on the development of construction technologies
(IES) including the construction IT applications.
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development of the Singaporean construction industry. Major relevant agencies and
organizations are listed and explained in Table 5.1. As shown in the table, several public
agencies are involved in the construction practice. Some agencies sometimes play
multiple roles in the practice. For example, HDB is the largest client in housing projects,
but at the same time, it is a building and development control agency. PWD and PUB are
also main clients in public projects, but also a building control agency at the same time.
Usually, contractors and architects must provide almost ten application forms to
different public agencies and offices to obtain a planning approval for the project, and
architects must consult at least almost twenty public departments and agencies for
referring to relevant regulations, submitting an appropriate applications, and getting a
certificate of conforming to the regulations (SIA, 1993). There are indeed many number
of information exchange channels between relevant parties. Worst of all, the process is
often discontinuous. Therefore, the practice becomes extremely complicated when a
project gets larger.
When viewed from a time series perspective, construction is a very long process,
taking generally over 2 years (Figure 5.2). A development application must first be made
and applicants have to wait generally 1 to 2 month until they get approval from
controlling agencies. Building plan applications can be submitted only after a particular
development plan is approved. The approval process takes even longer, usually 3 to 4
months. During this period, architects and other technical firms have to clear all the
regulations regarding architectural design and building safety. Reference and
Development
plan approval , Building plan approval Building
1-2 months 3-4 months
Building plan
Building safety
Fire safety
Tender
4 
z-z.o years
Figure 5.2: Construction practice in a time series
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consultation processes until getting the final building plan approval are extremely
complicated as discussed above, and at the same time, very time consuming.
5.2.2. Productivity improvement and internationalization
Construction industry is facing various environmental thrusts. Construction is
intrinsically a very labor-intensive process. Although some assembling and design work
has been automated thanks to the rapid progress of robotics and information technology,
most production work in construction sites still has to depend on a large amount of labor.
However, as discussed in chapter two, labor shortage have been consistently a severe
problem in the Singapore economy. In addition, the public impression of construction
works is still unfavorable, because of the dirty image of a construction site.
Consequently, the construction industry has had to rely on foreign labor to fulfill the
shortage to a greater extent than other industries. The ratio of foreign to domestic
workers exceeded 5.0 in 1992, and there is no possible immediate remedy for improving
it in near future (Ofori, 1993). Because the foreign labor pool is transient, a skilled
construction worker pool has hardly been developed. One of the major causes of low
construction productivity growth in the industry has been attributed to this problem. In
fact, a technological utilization level (machinery or IT utilization) in the industry is not
much behind that of other industrialized nations (CIDB taskforce, 1992). However, the
absolute shortage of skilled workers is dragging the utilization level down, and
consequently making an unequipped, labor-intensive construction process more
economical than an automated process.
Thus, construction productivity improvement has been identified as an imminent
thrust which the industry has to overcome for further development. A CIDB task force
report in 1992 made several recommendations for productivity improvement.
Standardization of a prefabricated assembly process and a computerized design process
were major components of the recommendations. Prefabrication improves the easiness to
build in a construction site, and the computerized design improves the complexity of the
information exchange processes. A strong initiative for re-engineering and standardizing
the whole industrial practices is necessary because the process is so dispersed and
distributed, involving various participants. Further difficulties arise because current
practical participants tend to regard current situations as economically optimal. Each
participant does not and can not care about the overall efficiency of the whole practice
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because of its complicated and dispersed nature of the practice. A similar situation was
also observed in the TradeNet case, but the implementation of a new re-engineered
process is apparently harder than that case because each participant has already proceeded
with the automation and computerization to some tangible extent at a local level.
On the other hand, the economic environment surrounding the construction
industry is rapidly changing in recent years. As shown in Figure 5.3, the growth of
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capital formation added by the construction has been fluctuating in recent years at lower
level than that of national GDP although the growth rate is higher than the national GDP
only in 1991. On the other hand, construction exports have been steady in the same
period since 1984, partly thanks to the promotion effort of the CIDB and the industry's
cost competitiveness in the international construction market. Figure 5.4 shows the trend
of construction export of local contractors. The ratio of export to domestic contracts
exceeded 10% in 1988 and shows gradual decline in recent years but showed the
symptom of upturn in 1992. The volume of export in 1992 is 1.6 million Singapore
dollars and it grew by over 1300% since 1984. Construction exports have now become
an important part of construction earnings.
In sum, the Singapore construction industry is facing lower productivity growth
and declining output problems domestically, but at the same time it is getting a
competitive edge in the international market. It should be stressed that they are not an
isolated issue. As the trend of internationalization is becoming apparent, Singapore
contractors have to compete with major foreign counterparts. As a project gets large in
the international level, better productivity and competitiveness are immediate thrusts for
the further development of the industry. However, the burden put on the industry is
heavier than that of the foreign counterparts because of the hopeless absolute labor
shortage.
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5.3. Current IT use in the industry
5.3.1. Computer-aided design and data exchange
Computer-Aided Design and Drawing (CADD) is the most prevalent usage of IT
in the construction industry. The CADD usage is mainly prevalent among Singaporean
architectural firms, and is also becoming prevalent among contractors in recent years.
However, existing CADD data formats are proprietary for a particular software in its
nature. There are some interexchangeable formats existing, but they generally lack
elaborate design and production information which are required for more advanced
production automation and prefabrication. Generally, only the graphical and drawing
parts of the CADD data are kept in those compatible formats. From the user's
perspective, although architects have had incentives to introduce the CADD systems for
raising their own design productivity, they have not had those for exchanging the data
Table 5.2: Major CADD data formats used in the Singaporean construction industry
Neutral CAD format Number Note
of
supported
softwares
Drawing IGES (Initial Graphics 21 Most commonly used format
information Exchange Specifications) originally published by ANSI.
only Strongly supported by the US
public sector.
DXF 7 Originally developed by
Autodesk, the developer of
AutoCAD. Almost de-facto
standard for microcomputer-
based CADD systems.
SIF (Standard Interface NA Originally developed by
format) Intergraph and supported by
several vendors
Drawing PDES (Product Data - Prospective CADD format. It
with some Exchange Standard) includes product information
production such as automated processing,
information manufacturing, inspection and
management.
STEP (Standard for the - Currently emerging
Exchange of Product prospective CADD formats
Definitions) defined by ISO. It includes
product information such as
automated processing,
manufacturing, inspection and
management.
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with other users. The necessity to exchange the CADD data has only recently emerged
when contractors and engineers also began to introduce the CADD system (Ho et al.,
1989). Major interexchangeable CADD formats used in the Singaporean construction
industry are described in Table 5.2. IGES, DXF, and SIF are major three such formats
currently used. Their usage is almost the same in terms of the number of firms
employing them, but IGES leads others in terms of the amount of supported CADD
software.
Having no compatibility among those interexchangeable formats led to a serious
problem when firms began to consider the data exchange. To solve this problem, the
Gruman International / Nanyang Technological Institute CAD/CAM Centre (GINTIC)
has begun research on the CADD data exchange by 1989 in collaboration with the CAD-
CAM Data Exchange Technical Centre of the UK. GINTIC's research concentrated on
the development and validation of the IGES translator which enables the data transfer
from local proprietary CADD data formats to the neutral IGES format. The selection of
the IGES as the industry standard was based on survey responses from CADD vendors.
The development of the translator was vested on each CADD vendors, and the service
offered by the GINTIC was limited to the validation of the developed translator. GINTIC
conducted extensive performance evaluation of various translators in 1989. GINTIC
reported that the success rate of translation fell between 60 to 80% then (Ho, 1989).
GINTIC attributed the cause of the imperfect translation to the improper understanding of
the CADD vendors on the IGES format. Notifying this problem, GINTIC began
researching on the flavoring program, which does pre- and post- processing on the data
made by the IGES translators. This flavoring program improves the translation success
rate. GINTIC offers the bureau service of this flavoring program and will continue to
research on the improvement of the program to catch up with the development of new
CADD software and the new version of the IGES format. The objective of this research
is to raise the translation success rate to 100%, but GINTIC at the same time considers
the transition of the standard from the IGES toward the PDES, a more advanced standard.
PDES features a production information support as well as drawing information, while
IGES only supports drawing information. PDES is expected to be one of the next
generation CADD format standards.
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The progress in the compatibility technology facilitated the development of a
CADD data exchange system. CADBase, a floppy-disk-based data exchange service for
the standard details of building products, became operational in 1990 (Ofori, 1993).
CADBase was established under collaboration of the Design Support Centre (DSC) of
CIDB and the Singapore Institute of Architects (SIA). CADBase enabled CAD users to
access the standardized building design information in a digital format. Its eventual
functional objective is to raise an architectural design productivity by 25%. It basically
offers the comprehensive digital library of standardized product symbols and matching
data sheets from 42 material manufacturers and public agencies. The number of
subscribers of the CADBase grew rapidly in initial years from 110 in 1991 to 210 by
1992, and is currently around 400 as of 1995. In 1991, the Graphical Data Exchange for
Construction Industry (GDECON) was introduced to this CAD-based information
exchange system (Ofori, 1993). GDECON is basically a data transfer system which
translates the CADD data of one software package to another. This was one of the
practical applications resulted from the CADD data compatibility technology
development. With the GDECON, almost all CADD users have no longer had to care
about the graphical incompatibility of the data among various CADD systems. This
CADBase system later got online with the introduction of the GraphNet. GraphNet was
jointly developed by SNS, NTU, and CIDB, and is operated by SNS. Its service includes
the translation service between different CADD formats, the online database service for
Figure 5.5: Concept and architecture of CADD data interexchange system
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the digitized drawings of standardized symbols and components, and the exchange
service for engineering specifications and architectural drawings among different
architects, contractors, and governmental agencies. In sum, it is exactly the online
version of the GDECON. The GraphNet service began only recently, but its subscription
has been very low due to the high cost of large graphical data transmission and the lack of
sophisticated computerization at a local level (Neo et al., 1993b).
5.3.2. Electronic application system and integrated land databases
The electronic application and approval system is another important IT
application development in the construction industry. Usually, application to a building
control and development control agency for the planning and technical regulation
approval is made by a paper. Although computerization in the design process is prevalent
among architectural and technical firms, they have to provide various different
application forms in a paper form. As described in the first section in this chapter, the
number of applications they have to provide is about ten at least and over twenty at most.
This complexity is one of the causes of lower productivity in the planning stage from an
applicant's perspective. From a governmental agency's perspective, the manual
evaluation and approval of such paper-based applications is also a tedious work. An
integrated electronic application system and database of site and regulation information
improves the approval process productivity. Construction of such a system could help
building and development control agencies to manage their site information, planners in
the agencies to make an effective decision on a particular application, and eventually
could improve civil service productivity a great deal. Therefore, the incentive to
construct such a database is very strong among those controlling agencies.
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Figure 5.6: Concept model of the ILUS
Historically, the development of an electronic application and database system has
been done separately by each relevant agency. The Integrated Land Use System (ILUS)
of the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) is a good example of the agency-based
electronic application and land data reference system (Ng, 1990). ILUS was developed
under collaboration of the NCB and URA, and the first part of it has become operational
by 1992. The functional objective of ILUS is not an application process automation.
Rather, it aims to construct an integrated national land database by employing the
Geographic Information System (GIS) technology. GIS can deal with both textual and
graphical information in an integrated way, which means not just as drawing or mapping
information. GIS can identify each building component or land parcel as it is while
showing them in a display in a graphical way. With the GIS, planners in the agencies can
easily identify the development constraints of a particular land portion, and can make an
effective and quick decision on whether to approve a particular development application.
Electronic planning submission subsystem has been developed as a mean for realizing the
input function of ILUS. Development planning part of the subsystem has already been
completed and the building planning, land safeguarding, and road planning part of the
subsystem are still under development. ILUS will also feature the reference service of
land information for relevant outside parties at free of cost. Therefore, there is also an
incentive for outside parties to introduce and subscribe the ILUS. According to a report
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from a high level URA official, the reference system is expected to be offered on the EDI
system to the professional community and by Teleview18 to the public.
Similar system, called the Integrated Land Information System (ILIS), has been
developed by the Housing and Development Board (HDB). ILIS is a land development
management system for HDB-managed land, similar to ILUS. ILIS employed the same
hardware architecture and equipment to maintain a compatibility with the ILUS (NCB,
1993h). Although the HDB expects the integration of ILIS and ILUS to form an
integrated national land database, a practical proposal for such integration has not yet
been made.
18 Teleview is a public information kiosk system located in major public places around Singapore. Its
service includes the offering of civil service information, corporate information, and media information. It
can also deal with some civil service transactions electronically without stopping by the public office. It
offers those service basically at free of cost.
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Figure 5.7: The National Database Hub
Source: Goh (1989)
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Figure 5.8: Concept model of the LandHub (SLDSN)
The Singapore Land Data Sharing Network (SLDSN), later renamed the
LandHub, is another example of an agency based application. SLDSN has been
developed in the context of the Civil Service Computerization Programme (CSCP),
which is discussed in chapter three. The civil service basically involves many kinds of
registry work. Each relevant ministry and statutory board often tried to collect a
necessary set of data individually; therefore, the collected data were often duplicated and
fragmented among the agencies. This inefficient situation called for the civil service re-
engineering study on a national database hub in 1983. The study identified three
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integrated databases to be constructed: land, people, and establishments (Figure 5.7).
Each of which was to be constructed by the Ministry of Law (MinLaw), the Ministry of
Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). SLDSN commenced as a
CSCP project under the MinLaw. The initial functional objective of the SLDSN system
was concentrated on the automation of digital map production, but later the MinLaw
perceived the construction of a more integrated land information system for effective land
planning as a more important objective. To realize this function, the project objective
was set to integrate all the duplicated and scattered land information which had been so
far managed by several governmental agencies. Thirteen governmental agencies were
involved in the management of the land data then; therefore, a necessity to coordinate the
interests of those agency emerged. A high level committee called the Land Systems
Committee (LSC) was appointed to conduct this mission. The LandHub was
implemented in 1990, and 27 government agencies currently subscribe to this service.
While SLDSN featured some dreamy functions, it yielded other problems which
were currently unexpected. The issues are mostly regarding the legality of electronic
documents. Usually registration of land requires a legal signature. Therefore, a
registration process itself must be done manually to follow the legality. Furthermore,
new security issues regarding the confidentiality and privacy of the data would emerge if
all the data are digitized. Copyright issues would also emerge if the data becomes easily
available. The definite solutions for these legislative problems has not yet been identified
although the effort to legislate them is still under rigorous discussion among relevant
agencies. 19 Because a land registry is basically a property issue, it is expected that the
solution would not easily come in a short term.
While above three examples in the developmental control and the land registry
areas have emerged in the context of the agencies' strong initiative to construct their own
database, there had not been any such agency based IT application in the building control
area. The concept of the BuildNet emerged in an effort to fill this gap. BuildNet was
developed jointly by the National Computer Board (NCB) and the Construction Industry
Development Board (CIDB) (Ko, 1990). Therefore, it is different from the three
applications discussed above in that it is a result from industrial promotion efforts by the
19 From the author's interview to a NCB official.
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CIDB rather than that from internal spontaneous initiatives by the building control
agencies. BuildNet is basically an integrated application processing system comprising
an electronic application submission system, a regulation codes reference system, and an
intelligent database system (Ofori, 1993). Applicants can refer to the database for
retrieving regulations, legislation, and official circulars, and can submit building plan
applications electronically with the submission system. The planners and designers in the
controlling agencies can evaluate and process those applications with the intelligent
database, and make a quick and effective decision on a particular approval.
Currently, the submission system of the BuildNet employs a text-based EDI;
therefore, the information retrieved or submitted is limited to text-based information.
BuildNet is expected to employ graphic-based EDI standards to expand its capability, but
practical plan has not been made. In fact, standardization for graphic-based EDI is not
yet settled in international community. Several CADD software vendors employ their
own graphic-based EDI, and the specification of them is generally proprietary (Ko,
1989b). Some attempts to establish a graphic-based EDI standard specifically designed
for the construction industry have been made such as the one used in the GraphNet, but a
certain standard has not emerged yet. Because conforming to the international standard is
especially important for the Singaporean construction industry, whether a graphic-based
standard for the industry will emerge in the short term is still uncertain.
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5.3.3. Low IT usage and initiative for inter-organizational applications
Some practical forms of the inter-organizational network have already emerged in
an attempt to facilitate the computerization level in the industry. As was previously
noted, historically, the level of computer usage in the Singaporean construction industry
has been low compared with other economic sectors. Even though computer usage has
been prevalent among architects and technical firms, it has been very low among non-
technical firms such as contractors. A study by NCB in 1994 picked up the number of
employees per computers as a statistic for measuring IT installation in the industry (NCB,
1994i). The number is 5.9 people per one PC, WS, or other computer terminal in the
construction industry, while the numbers are 5.2 people in a manufacturing sector and 3.0
people in a transport sector (Table 5.3). Even among the firms which use computers, they
mostly use the computers in non-strategic fields such as word-processing, accounting,
and local databases. Furthermore, the percentage of networked computers is still
relatively low. The same NCB study reported that the percentage of the computers which
have a network connection with others was 50% in an intra-organizational level and 46%
in an inter-organizational level (NCB, 1994i). Those percentages are the lowest among
all the economic sectors (Table 5.4 and 5.5). The major cause for the low networking
deployment has been identified as the high complexity of professional practices.
Furthermore, the high ratio of SMEs in the industry also identified as a cause of the lower
computerization and networking deployment. SMEs have been hesitant to implement
Table 5.3: Number of employees per PC, WS, or other computer terminal (1994)
Construction I Manufacturing Transport Public sector Overall
5.9 15.2 3.0 l.8 2.8
Source: NCB (1994i)
Table 5.4: Percentage of PCs / WSs networked to other computers inside firms
employing 10 or more people (Intra-organizational networking)
Construction Manufacturing Transport Public sector Overall
50 % 157 % 67 % 192 % 166 %
Source: NCB (1994i)
Table 5.5: Percentage of network links connected to at least one business partner among
firms employing 10 or more people (Inter-organizational networking)
Construction Manufacturing Transort J Public sector I Overall
46% 161% 180 % 96 % 70 %
Source: NCB (1994i)
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such a large scale computer system because of the high cost of equipment and the
ignorance of the rapid technological changes in the IT field (Ofori, 1993). These reasons
are almost the same as the ones identified in the survey conducted before the
implementation of the Small Enterprise Computerization Programme (SECP), which is
discussed in chapter three.
The Construction Industry Network (CoInNet) has emerged in an attempt to
facilitate computer usage among the local contractors (Ofori, 1993). CoInNet is basically
an information reference service for contractors. It was developed with the collaboration
of NCB, CIDB, and Singapore Contractors Association Limited (SCAL), and launched
by SNS in 1992 (Neo et al., 1993b). CoInNet offers subscribers (contractors) information
on material's prices, tender results, contractor profiles, and market analyses to help them
make an effective decision in bidding for a tender. In an effort to facilitate computer
usage in contractors' community, NCB, CIDB, and SCAL also jointly developed general
specifications for local contractors for choosing appropriate computer equipment (Ofori,
1993).
Figure 5.9: Concept model of the CoInNet
Clints 4
Co-brokerage
Figure 5.10: Concept model of the RealNet
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RealNet is another such IT development in the real estate industry. RealNet was
developed with the collaboration of SNS and real estate industry and became fully
operational by 1992 (Neo et al., 1993b). Unlike the CoInNet, the RealNet is not just an
information service. It offers an online co-brokerage practice in the industry by
employing EDI technology (Figure 5.10). RealNet lists clients' properties which are
tended to be sold. Real estates agents can easily search a list of properties which meet the
needs of a buying client with the database function equipped in the RealNet.
These efforts to construct an inter-organizational data network have begun only
recently, but an incentive for local SMEs is still not so significant. Although information
on the number of subscribers of those networks have not been made available to the
public, the NCB survey in 1994, which is mentioned above, shows still lower usage of IT
in the industry. Additional policy measures for the deployment of IT among the SMEs is
apparently necessary to realize high IT deployment and network subscription in the
industry.
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5.4. Integration into CORENET --- features and difficulties of
implementation
5.4.1. Technical features and difficulties
The Construction and Real Estate Network (CORENET) is a new concept jointly
developed by NCB and MND in 1993 as an answer to the IT2000 sectoral application
presented in the IT2000 report of 1992. The concept model of the CORENET is shown
in Figure 5.11. Its basic concept is to link all the existing relevant IT applications under a
standardized framework. In so doing, CORENET aims to shorten the transaction time
required for the information exchange among various parties involved in the construction
and real estates practices, and to yield a new economic value by enhancing overall
industrial productivity. The BuildNet concept had disappeared since the release of this
concept. The reason for it is uncertain, but it might be incorporated into the CORENET
concept because of the similarity. In the public release of the CORENET in 1993, NCB
presented the following application services to be implemented in the first stage of its
development.
(1) Integrated submission: Electronic submission, notification, and payment of both text
Figure 5.11: Concept model of the CORENET
Source: NCB (1993b)
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and graphics based applications made to regulatory agencies.
(2) Information services: Information reference service at all stages of building life cycle.
(3) Procurement services: Material acquisition, tendering, and procurement of all the
construction related services offered by both government and private sectors.
The electronic submission concept presented in the BuildNet is again presented as
the Service (1), Integrated submission. This service function is partly realized currently
in the ILUS and ILIS. Service (2), Information services, are realized in all applications
discussed in the previous subchapter. Service (3), Procurement services, are partly
realized in the CoInNet. Therefore, it seems that the integration of these local and agency
based applications is easy from the service function's perspective. However, technical
difficulties emerge if the technical infrastructure and standards currently used in each
service are considered. Figure 5.12 illustrates the categorization based on these factors.
RealNet and CoInNet currently use text-based EDI standard. Among the graphic-based
applications, only GraphNet formally stated the use of a graphic-based EDI, although
precise technical specification for it has not become public. The transition of the CADD
data standard is another issue in this field. The current recommended standard is IGES,
but it is expected that a more advanced standard such as PDES or STEP would become
prevalent in the near future. In responding to the author's interview, a responsible NCB
official expressed an interest in STEP as the CORENET standard, but it is still uncertain
if it would become the next generation international CADD standard because it is
reported that GINTIC research on the CAD data exchange concentrates on PDES as the
next generation standard. ILUS and ILIS are also expected to employ a graphic-based
EDI, but those for ILUS and ILIS will be different because they need to be more suitable
for their GIS system rather than the architectural CADD system. The hurdle between
them may not be so high, but some coordination or translation system is necessary to
Service
Data format
Figure 5.12
I GraphNet ILISandHub
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,:
incorporate them into the unified CORENET framework. On the other hand, no apparent
statement to implement the EDI standard has been announced yet about the LandHub.
5.4.2. Non-technical issues
Implementation of the CORENET involves various constraints other than the
technical factors described above. In the TradeNet case, TDB announced the overall re-
engineering of the professional practices in the industry, and made the subscription to the
network mandatory for the trade community. The situations are somewhat similar, but
also somewhat different in this CORENET case. From the discussions made in the
previous subchapters, constraints specific for the construction industry can be identified
as follows.
(1) Distributed and discontinuous practice: Construction is a far more distributed and
discontinuous process compared with other industries such as manufacturing or trading.
If re-engineering of the practice of construction is required to implement the plan, a
higher level coordination is necessary because it involves different ministerial realms
(law, land development, and commerce). Coordination led by a statutory board, which
has played a significant role in the TradeNet case, will not be satisfactory in this case.
(2) Legal issues: Disputes on the legality of electronic documents have not been settled
yet at a parliamentary level. Because real property issues are largely involved in the
construction industry case, solutions would not easily come like other cases which only
involve monetary and trade transactions. The re-engineering of those monetary and trade
transactions is easier than that of the real property transactions because most of the
former cases do not involve the transactions between public and private sectors. In the
TradeNet case, such public-private transaction exists in the clearing process of trade
documents between TDB and traders, but such legal clearing issues were incorporated
into the TradeNet re-engineered model under the leadership of TDB. However, in the
CORENET case, no significant coordination or leadership effort by NCB, CIDB or a
higher level to solve this issue has been observed yet. Unless this legal issues is solved,
the integration of the land related databases such as ILUS and the LandHub will be
difficult. This would make the subscription to such services unattractive for prospective
users.
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(3) High graphical data transmission cost: Unlike other industries, the data exchanged
during the construction practice is mostly graphic-based. The largeness of the graphic
data imposes a huge transmission cost on network subscribers. As Singapore contractors
and other technical firms are mostly SMEs, this would be a hampering factor for an
incentive to subscribe to such a graphic-based network.
To solve the problems caused by the first problem of the construction processes,
distributed and discontinuous nature, there is apparently a need for a higher level
authority to coordinate the interests of relevant parties. The National IT Committee
(NITC), which is discussed in chapter three, may work as a coordination mechanism, but
a new special task force is necessary for effective coordination. The second problem
caused by legal uncertainties is a fundamental bottleneck for the successful
implementation of CORENET. It must be discussed thoroughly at a parliamentary and
ministerial level. The third problem, the cost of graphics transmission, can be
approached dually by the reduction of network costs and the provision of further financial
incentives to the SMEs. The rate reduction for the high-speed data network must be done
in a long run, but a sudden decrease in the network subscription prices can not be
expected. The financial schemes for SMEs are mostly offered by Economic
Development Board (EDB), which is discussed in chapter three, but they are currently not
enough to deploy graphic-based computer terminals among most SMEs. Development of
another incentive scheme which specifically for the construction industry is necessary
like the SECP case, which is discussed in chapter three.
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5.5. Conclusion for chapter 5
The construction industry has an extremely complicated professional practice.
The transactions to be done during the whole construction practices are so many that the
complexity of the practice lowers the planning and design productivity. The construction
industry is also facing severe environmental concerns; a consistent labor shortage and
resultant low industrial productivity. As the labor shortage problem will not easily be
solved, the enhancement of productivity in the planning and design stage is one of the
most important agenda items for the overall productivity enhancement for the
construction industry.
IT use in the industry is progressing rapidly in the CADD data exchange and land
information databases areas. CADD data exchange is currently done in the IGES format
which only supports drawing information. It is expected that the next generation CADD
standard would include drawing and production information in one format, but
standardization for such a format is still uncertain in both the Singaporean and
international communities. On the other hand, the development of land database services
has shown remarkable progress. However, because an effort to construct such a database
has emerged through each agency's own initiative, no idea of future integration has been
conceptualized in the process of constructing those databases.
The newly released IT2000 NII policy presented a new IT application in the
construction and real estates sector. Currently, the only practical plan presented is to
integrate currently existing applications with a unified framework, and in so doing,
enhance the overall industrial productivity. However, as we observe the problems
associated with database integration, there are still both technical and non-technical
problems to be solved for successful implementation. Some technical and political
measures must be taken to realize that dreamy network.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
6.1. Key findings on the role of IT in the development of the Singaporean
construction industry
This chapter reviews the findings of the previous chapters and draws conclusions
to the question presented in chapter one.
Can the proposed CORENET project really be a new economic engine as the IT2000 plan expects?
Overall, what policy measures should the government take to realize this expectation? (Chapter one of this
thesis)
Chapter two reviewed the history of Singaporean economic development while paying
attention to the role of IT and telecommunications as a catalyst for activating the
economy. It was shown that all three stages of the national IT development effort have
been carefully planned to meet the state's strategic economic goals. Chapter three further
investigated the institutional framework for national IT policy formation. It found that
initiatives by the NCB have played a very significant role in forming national IT policies,
but there is also evidence that multiagency collaboration is another critical factor for the
successful implementation of the IT policies. Chapter four analyzed the economic
presence and contribution of the construction industry through an econometric analysis.
Although the models assumptions are still primitive, it is evident from the simulations
that computer installations of minicomputers have been related to productivity
improvement. However, the analysis results also suggest that the productivity
improvement has hardly been related to overall industrial output. This suggests the
existence of other significant factors which discourage output. Chapter five investigated
current use of IT in the construction industry and analyzed the potential and difficulties
regarding the integration of various databases and information services into the proposed
CORENET. Both technical and non-technical factors are identified as constraints for the
successful implementation of the proposed plan.
As we review these discussions, we can see the following important points as a
key to answer the question presented at the beginning of this thesis.
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(1) IT in the economy: IT has been a critical strategic tool for both economic and
industrial development. Technically, it improves the productivity of professional
practices substantially. However, the successful implementation of inter-organizational
IT applications in a particular industry requires the resolution of a large number of non-
technical issues. In the so far successful cases such as the TradeNet, the non-technical
issues have been solved by multiagency collaboration efforts at a statutory board level,
but there is no guarantee that this framework works in more complicated situations in
other industries. IT may improve professional productivity at a local level, but the key
for contributing to the overall economic success of the industry mostly remains in the
non-technical field. Therefore, appropriate policy measures should be taken to make IT
implementation a real industrial development tool. Those measures may include the
institutionalization of a project-specified framework for each particular project, and the
solution of other social and legal issues inherent in a particular industry.
(2) Construction in the economy: Environmental concerns surrounding the construction
industry are very severe. Low productivity is mostly the result of the severe labor
shortage in the economy, high professional turnover, and the dirty image of the
construction industry. The construction boom has already passed, and the industry's
presence in the national economy is declining in recent years. The industry also has now
to face severe international competition for survival. It has been identified by the
construction industry professional community that productivity enhancement is important
for further development of the industry. However, progress in productivity enhancement
has not been significant historically. The complicated nature of professional practices in
the industry is identified as a limiting factor. Automation in the planning and design
process has shown a tangible progress to some extent, but only at a dispersed level. The
proposed integrated IT applications may have the potential to solve these issues.
However, the key to successful implementation is how and to what extent the IT
application can catch and absorb the problems that the industry currently has. This is
exactly what is identified in the point (1) above. Unfortunately, the current CORENET
proposal only states the objective of the integration of existing systems, and does not
express how such a social and industrial objective can be achieved. A more
comprehensive discussion at a higher level is definitely necessary to draw a fundamental
solution for the further development of the industry.
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6.2. Policy recommendations
The questions presented are again cited from chapter one as follows:
Can the proposed CORENET project really be a new economic engine as the IT2000 plan expects?
Overall, what policy measures should the government take to realize this expectation? (Chapter one of this
thesis)
The above analyses answer these questions. The contents of the currently proposed
CORENET plan are not enough to realize its fundamental objective. Considering the
problems and environmental pressures presented above, this thesis presents the following
policy recommendation for the successful implementation of the project.
(1) Provide a new financial incentive to SMEs: A high subscription rate to CORENET
among the small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) is apparently a key to the overall
improvement of construction industry productivity. The current financial incentives
offered by the Economic Development Board (EDB) or the National Computer Board
(NCB) can not be regarded as sufficient to facilitate the installation of high-priced
graphic-based computer terminals among the SMEs. A substantial budget must be
planned if government expects high subscription to the network. Because of the
substantial cost imposed on the SMEs, which take up the most part of the Singaporean
construction industry, simply making a subscription mandatory is not a good policy,
although such measures did work in the TradeNet case, which only required the text-
based computerization. SMEs will suffer economic difficulties and therefore industrial
output will not be improved if such mandatory policy is implemented without the
financial support and subsidy from the state.
(2) Establish a higher level control committee: Currently, the CORENET project is
steered by the sectoral group inside the National Information Infrastructure Division
(NIID) of the National Computer Board (NCB) as described in chapter three. However,
as discussed in chapter five, there are some non-technical issues that have to be solved to
create the integrated network. A higher controlling authority specially designed for these
construction industry and property issues is definitely necessary. Creation of a new
institution under the current National Information Technology Committee (NITC)
framework is one idea to realize it, but representation from the Ministry of Law
(MinLaw) is anyway necessary to solve the fundamental legal and land registry issues.
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(3) Carefully observe the development of international standards: Technically, a standard
for graphic data exchange has not been settled internationally for either the Electronic
Data Interexchange (EDI) or Computer-aided Design and Drafting (CADD). Each
agency has to carefully monitor progress in international standardization and has to avoid
employing a non-standard technology to implement the project. This means that each
responsible agency does not have to rush into the immediate implementation of the
project. Conforming to the international standard is particularly important as
internationalization in the construction industry has been progressing rapidly in recent
years. Needless to say, the Singaporean technical community has to continue to
cooperate with the international community to establish the international standards in
these fields.
Only if all these policy recommendations are properly implemented, will the
CORENET project meet great economic success. It is highly recommended that the
National Computer Board (NCB), the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB),
and other policy planning agencies consider these factors, and possibly expand the
currently proposed project to incorporate them.
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6.3. Concluding remarks
Contrary to the dreamy image of the NII, implementing network integration
projects such as CORENET are an extremely hard task. As Singapore is a leading
country in such IT application projects at a national level, it has to find its own solution
with its own effort. IT2000 identifies the CORENET as a new engine for further
economic growth, but the currently proposed plan is not enough to meet this goal. The
responsible policy planning agencies have to perceive this point, and proceed with the
plan with careful attention to the particular environment surrounding the industry.
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